



## Dissemination material from second Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop

Vera Ferraiuolo (DBL)

Short abstract: Future Sky Safety is a Joint Research Programme (JRP) on Safety, initiated by EREA, the association of European Research Establishments in Aeronautics. The Programme contains two streams of activities: 1) coordination of the safety research programmes of the EREA institutes and 2) collaborative research projects on European safety priorities.

This deliverable is produced by the Project 2 "Dissemination Exploitation and Communication". The main objective is to present the main outcomes of the second Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop, together with the material produced to improve the internal dissemination of information.

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## Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
ACARE	Advisory Council for Aviation Research in Europe
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
ATM	Air Traffic Management
CAQ	Cabin Air Quality
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency
EC	European Commission
ECAM	Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor
ECS	Environmental Control Systems
EFB	Electronic Flight Bag
EEA	European Research Establishments in Aeronautics
EU	European Union
FSS	Future Sky Safety
HMI	Human Machine Interface
HPE	Human Performance Envelope
INEA	Innovation and Networks Executive Agency
OM-B	Operations Manual part B
PFD	Primary Flight Display
R&D	Research and Development
R&TD	Research and Technology Development
RO	Risk Observatory
SESAR	Single European Sky ATM Research
SMS	Safety Management System
SPS	Safe Performance System
SRIA	Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda
WP	Work Package

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Problem Area

Dissemination and exploitation of knowledge is a key ingredient for any successful research Programme. Dissemination is made through a set of specific, coordinated actions. Several dissemination and communication actions are undertaken for raising wider public participation and awareness, to engage with actors beyond the research community (also non-specialised people) and with public as a whole. In addition to these Programme external dissemination activities, it is important to also timely disseminate results internally within the Programme and with the European Commission and EU-related services. Besides the distribution of reports, deliverables and scientific publications, Future Sky Safety organizes two internal workshops on the complete Programme evolution and results for the whole consortium and EC (European Commission).

### Description of Work

The objective of this document is to present the main outcomes of the second Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop, together with the material produced to improve the internal dissemination of information.

The second Internal Workshop consisted of two days, organized at the premises of the German Aerospace Center (DLR) in Köln, Germany on the 6-7<sup>th</sup> of December, 2017.

This report illustrates the dissemination actions and materials produced to promote the workshop and facilitate the transmission of information.

### Results & Conclusions

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop was held on the 6-7<sup>th</sup> of December, 2017 in Köln, Germany at the German Aerospace Center (DLR) premises. About 40 people from the Consortium and representatives of EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) took part in the event. It focused on the presentation of the achievements and progress of the five technical projects (P3, P4, P5, P6, P7) in the Programme. Presentations were well received by the participants, and fostered a fruitful internal discussion on research needs and future steps.

All FSS (Future Sky Safety) projects were properly represented at the event. Each presentation generated interesting and fruitful discussions, with several interventions from the participants to discuss both the technical aspects of the projects and the more theoretical/high level ones. Participants particularly appreciated the presentation of the main outcomes of each project, which matched the workshop objectives to share the main achievements to improve the internal coordination and overall awareness. A guided tour of the poster exhibition complemented the presentations given, and was very well received by participants as well.

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Overall, the workshop fully reached its objectives, in terms of awareness of the full consortium about projects goals and activities and of awareness of programme technical progress up to date.

## Applicability

This document supports the dissemination of FSS results, both internally within the Programme and with the European Commission and EU-related services. In particular, it provides insight into FSS research on:

- P3 Solutions for runway excursions
- P4 Total system risk assessment
- P5 Resolving the organizational accident
- P6 Human performance envelope
- P7 Mitigating the risk of fire, smoke and fumes

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. The Programme

FUTURE SKY SAFETY is an EU-funded transport research programme in the field of European aviation safety, with an estimated initial budget of about € 30 million, which brings together 33 European partners to develop new tools and new approaches to aviation safety, initially over a four-year period starting in January 2015. The two main objectives of Future Sky Safety Programme are:

- **Coordination of institutional safety research programmes**, funded by the EREA (European Research Establishments in Aeronautics) institutes;
- **Collaborative safety research** on safety risk priority areas (co-funded by the EC).

The Programme research focuses on four main topics:

- Building ultra-resilient vehicles and improving the cabin safety;
- Reducing risk of accidents;
- Improving processes and technologies to achieve near-total control over the safety risks;
- Improving safety performance under unexpected circumstances.

EU is funding specific **Collaborative Safety Research** projects:

- Perform breakthrough safety research to enable a significant reduction of runway excursion risk in the medium term.
- Develop a prototype risk observatory to assess and monitor safety risks throughout the Total Aviation System and allow frequent update of the assessment of risks.
- Reduce the likelihood of organisational accidents in aviation via development and implementation of a Safe Performance System (SPS).
- Define and apply the Human Performance Envelope for cockpit operations and design, and determine methods to recover crew's performance to the centre of the envelope, and consequently to augment this envelope, through HMI (Human-Machine Interface) principles, procedures or training.
- Develop solutions to mitigate the risk of fire, smoke and fumes related (fatal) accidents.

**Coordination/cooperation of institutional safety research programmes** connects and drives the complementary in-house Safety R&D (Research and Development) in the European aeronautical research establishments. This achieves significant leverage of the invested EU funding through a more efficient and effective use of resources.

The Programme will also help to coordinate the research and innovation agendas of several countries and institutions, as well as to create synergies with other EU initiatives in the field (e.g. SESAR – Single European Sky ATM Research, Clean Sky 2). Future Sky Safety is set up with an expected seven years duration, divided into two phases.

Future Sky Safety contributes to the EC Work Programme Topic MG.1.4-2014 Coordinated research and innovation actions targeting the highest levels of safety for European aviation in Call/Area Mobility for Growth – Aviation of Horizon 2020 Societal Challenge Smart, Green and Integrated Transport. Future Sky Safety addresses Safety challenges of the ACARE (Advisory Council for Aviation Research in Europe) Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda (SRIA).

## 1.2. Project context

Dissemination, exploitation and communication of knowledge are a key ingredient for any successful research project. Future Sky Safety Project P2 is specifically dedicated to Dissemination, Exploitation and Communication; its goals are to:

- Develop a dissemination plan and communication strategies;
- Disseminate safety research findings to relevant target audience;
- Develop a plan for exploitation of results;
- Develop a knowledge and data management policy and approach;
- Assess dissemination activities.

Project P2 ensures that all aspects of dissemination are efficiently and effectively managed over the entire duration of the project, aiming at communicating in a consistent and distinctive way, while engaging and involving different categories of audiences. In this context, an appropriate strategy for the dissemination assessment, with specific quantifiable targets needs to be developed and implemented.

## 1.3. Research objectives

The objective of this document is to present the main outcomes of the second Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop, together with the material produced to improve the internal dissemination of information. This Workshop was held on the 6-7<sup>th</sup> of December, 2017 in Köln, Germany at the German Aerospace Center (DLR) premises.

The document is intended for the Workshop participants as minutes of the event, and for the partners who were not able to attend to provide the relevant information about the workshop content.

The document also reports the dissemination actions undertaken to promote the event, and the dissemination material produced for the workshop participants.

## 1.4. Approach

Minutes of the event, presentations and dissemination material are all included in this report. The report also illustrates the main recommendations drawn from the event, which can be applied to improve the effectiveness and resonance of the last FSS Public Workshop.

## 1.5. Structure of the document

Section 2 presents an overview of the event held in Köln on the 6-7<sup>th</sup> of December 2017: the 2<sup>nd</sup> FSS Internal Workshop. Section 2.1 reports the promotional activities related to the workshop. Section 2.2

provides the structure of the workshop, illustrating its agenda. Section 2.3 provides minutes for each technical presentation given. Section 2.4 illustrates the dissemination material supporting communication during the workshop.

Section 3 reports the main conclusions and lessons learnt, together with recommendations for future FSS Workshops.

Appendices include the list of participants to the Internal Workshop (Appendix A), presentations given during the Internal Workshop (Appendix B), the Internal Workshop Posters (Appendix C) and photographs from the workshop (Appendix D).

## 2 SECOND FUTURE SKY SAFETY INTERNAL WORKSHOP

The Second Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop was held on the 6-7<sup>th</sup> of December 2017 in Köln, Germany, kindly hosted by the German Aerospace Center (DLR). The workshop was directed to the FSS Consortium with the overall goals of providing all Consortium members technical and scientific progress of the five collaborative projects initiated within Future Sky Safety (P3, P4, P5, P6, P7).

Pictures from the workshop can be found in Appendix D.

### 2.1. Promotion of the workshop

The event was promoted via email and through the project website, with a dedicated page<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.futuresky-safety.eu/2nd-future-sky-safety-internal-workshop/>

A save-the-date and later a final invitation (including agenda) were produced. Both of them were sent periodically via e-mail to more than 200 contacts. As a result, 55 people registered to the event.



The poster features a background image of an airplane flying over a cloudy sky. In the top left corner, the Future Sky Safety logo is displayed. The main text is contained within a dark blue box with white text. Below this box, there is a light grey box containing the event details and a list of topics. At the bottom left, there is a dark blue box with white text providing the location. At the bottom right, the website URL is provided.

**Save the date**

**FUTURE SKY SAFETY**  
**2<sup>nd</sup> Consortium Workshop**  
**6-7 December 2017**

Future Sky Safety is pleased to announce its 2nd Consortium Workshop to be held in Cologne, at DLR Headquarters, on the 6-7 of December, 2017.

The Consortium Workshop will be the opportunity to provide all Consortium members with progress on the five collaborative projects initiated within Future Sky Safety. Updates will include:

- An overview of the project;
- A presentation of the overall technical progress and results to date;
- A vision on the possibilities for exploitation.

The Workshop will also be a chance to network and to discuss the latest research developments on key topics such as:

- Reduction of Runway excursion;
- Total aviation system risk prevention and mitigation;
- Reduction of the likelihood of organisational accidents;
- Improvement of pilot performance and reduction of human errors;
- Mitigation of risk of fire, smoke and fumes in modern cabins.

**The workshop is reserved to Future Sky Safety Consortium members.**  
Registration is required; registration form and workshop agenda will be available soon at: <https://www.futuresky-safety.eu/2nd-future-sky-safety-internal-workshop>

**where**


**DLR | Cologne**  
Linder Höhe  
51147 Cologne

[www.futuresky-safety.eu](http://www.futuresky-safety.eu)

Figure 1: Initial save-the-date for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop



A dedicated page on the project website provided participants with all the relevant information regarding the workshop, such as date and location, registration link and an overview of the scope and objectives of the event.



The screenshot shows a webpage titled "2ND FUTURE SKY SAFETY INTERNAL WORKSHOP". The main header features the Future Sky Safety logo and an image of an airplane. Below the header is a "Save the date" banner for the "FUTURE SKY SAFETY 2<sup>nd</sup> Consortium Workshop". The main content area includes the following sections:

- EVENT**
  - Date(s)**: 06/12/2017 to 07/12/2017
- VENUE/LOCATION**
  - German Aerospace Center (DLR) Headquarters** Linder Höhe 51147 Cologne (Germany)
- REGISTRATION**
  - Registration to this event is required. Please click the button below to finalize your registration.
  - [REGISTER HERE](#)

The main text of the page reads: "FUTURE SKY SAFETY, FUTURE SKY SAFETY" dated 09/25/2017. It announces the "2nd Consortium Workshop" to be held in Cologne, at DLR Headquarters, on the 6-7 of December, 2017. The workshop will provide all Consortium members with progress on the five collaborative projects initiated within Future Sky Safety programme. Updates will include:

- An overview of the projects;
- A presentation of the overall technical progress and results to date;
- A vision on the possibilities for exploitation.

The Workshop will also be a chance to network and to present and discuss the latest research developments on the 5 key topics:

1. Reduction of runway excursion;
2. Total aviation system risk prevention and mitigation;
3. Reduction of the likelihood of organisational accidents;
4. Improvement of pilot performance and reduction of human errors;
5. Mitigation of risk of fire, smoke and fumes in modern cabins.

The workshop is reserved to Future Sky Safety Consortium members. Registration is required via this [registration form](#).

**MATERIALS AND RESULTS**

- [FSS-2nd-internal-workshop-invitation-and-agenda.pdf](#)

Navigation: events > internal workshop > workshop

**Figure 3: Dedicated webpage for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop**

## 2.2. Structure of the workshop

The focus of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Internal Workshop was to present, share and discuss the main results achieved by the EC funded technical projects (P3, P4, P5, P6 and P7). For this reason, room for discussion was left at the end of each presentation batch, with 10 minutes dedicated to the questions and answers between the Project Managers and the workshop audience. The technical presentation given by Project leaders during

the Workshop are reported in Appendix B; and are also shared with the Consortium via EMDESK<sup>2</sup>, together with all the other technical presentations provided at the workshop.

As it can be seen in Table 1, the technical sessions were to be preceded by invited speakers providing the institutional framework:

- EC perspective on Future Sky Safety and European research given by EC-INEA (Innovation and Networks Executive Agency);
- EREA and Future Sky Joint Research Initiative given by a member of the EREA Board;
- Overview of the entire Future Sky Safety programme given by Programme Coordinator Michel Piers.

**Table 1: Agenda of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Internal Workshop**

<i>Future Sky Safety 2<sup>nd</sup> Internal Workshop</i>		
<b>DAY 1</b>		
10:00	<i>Welcome</i>	
10:15	<i>Introductory Remarks</i>	<i>EC-INEA</i>
10:30	<i>Future Sky</i>	<i>EREA BOARD</i>
11:00	<i>Future Sky Safety Programme</i>	<i>NLR</i> Michel Piers
<i>P3: Solutions for Runway Excursion</i>		
11:30	<i>Short Overview of the Project /Overall Technical Progress and Results / Exploitation</i>	<i>NLR</i> Peter van der Geest
12:00	<i>New technologies for reducing runway excursions</i>	<i>Thales Group</i> Frédéric Barbaresco
12:30	<i>Crosswind and Tailwind Reconstruction using Flight Data</i>	<i>NLR</i> Peter van der Geest
13:00	<i>Discussion</i>	
13:10	<i>Lunch</i>	

<sup>2</sup> Folder: Workshops Dissemination – Internal Workshop 2 (T37)

<b>P4: Total system risk assessment</b>		
14:30	<i>Short Overview of the Project /Overall Technical Progress and Results / Exploitation</i>	<b>NLR</b> Joram Verstraeten
15:00	<i>Risk modelling</i>	<b>Airbus</b> Sylvain Metge
15:30	<i>Risk Observatory software development</i>	<b>CEiiA</b> Fábio João Oliveira
16:00	<i>Discussion</i>	
16:10	Coffee Break	
<b>Poster session</b>		
16:30	<i>Introduction of available posters</i>	<b>NLR</b> Michel Piers
17:15	<i>Partnering Event - Visit of the poster Area</i>	
18:00	End of First Day	
<b>DAY 2</b>		
09:00	<i>Welcome</i>	<b>NLR</b>
<b>P5: Resolving the organizational accident</b>		
09:10	<i>Are we any closer to resolving the organizational accident? Short Overview of the Project /Overall Technical Progress and Results / Exploitation</i>	<b>Eurocontrol</b> Barry Kirwan
09:40	<i>Safety Mindfulness – a practical application for an airline</i>	<b>TCD</b> Nick McDonald
10:10	<i>Towards an airport-wide safety dashboard</i>	<b>Deep Blue</b> Carlo Valbonesi
10:40	<i>Discussion</i>	
10:50	Coffee Break	

<b>P6: Human performance envelope</b>		
11:00	<b>Overview of the Project Human Performance Envelope</b>	<b>EUROCONTROL</b> Barry Kirwan
11:30	<b>Can we exploit technology to measure the Human Performance Envelope?</b>	<b>Cranfield University</b> Jim Nixon
12:00	<b>Simulator research and development of new cockpit interfaces</b>	<b>Lufthansa</b> Carsten Schmidt-Moll
12:30	<b>Discussion</b>	
12:40	Lunch	
<b>P7: Mitigating risks of fire, smoke and fumes</b>		
13:50	<b>Short Overview of the Project /Overall Technical Progress and Results / Exploitation</b>	<b>ONERA</b> Eric Deletombe
14:20	<b>Characterization of the thermo-mechanical behaviour of CFRP (T700/M21) under high temperature conditions</b>	<b>ONERA</b> J. Berthe, C. Huchette
14:50	<b>Cabin Air Quality- overview of issues and future directions</b>	<b>Embraer</b> Ricardo Reis
15:20	<b>Discussion</b>	
15:30	<b>Wrap-up</b>	<b>NLR</b> Michel Piers
16:00	End of Second Day	

- EC-INEA could not participate to the event due to other institutional commitments.
- Volker Krajenski (DLR) as host of the meeting provided an introduction on DLR, on the DLR site in Cologne and main performed activities.
- Marcello Amato (CIRA), as a member of the EREA Board, presented EREA and the Future Sky Joint Research Programme. The first part of the presentation covered the EREA organisation and its activities, objectives and peculiarities, such as its specific approach from invention to innovation. The second part, dedicated to Future Sky, illustrated how the Programme is looking even further, building on four 4 pillars (safety, noise, energy, and air transport integration) and pushing two types of activities: the coordination of institutional activities, and the proposal of collaborative projects at European level.

- Programme Coordinator Michel Piers gave an overview of Future Sky Safety and provided updates concerning the two objectives of the Programme: R&TD (Research and Technology Development) activities and the coordination of institutional programmes. Overall, the technical projects are doing quite well, progressing as expected apart from small delays.
  - P3 is progressing as expected.
  - P4 will need to issue and demonstrate its Risk Observatory software.
  - P5 has been very active on Safety culture and appeared in the media on this topic. The project is close to making an actual, immediate impact on aviation; a good impact is already perceived at a political level.
  - P6 is going well, and experiments and modelling are progressing.
  - P7 is progressing nicely on its research on new materials, on the characterization of the fire behaviour of primary structure composite materials and on solutions to mitigate smoke and fumes in cabin environment.

Michel Piers highlighted that 2018 is crucial to FSS with respect to exploitation and dissemination, as the Programme needs to demonstrate its impact and clear connections to applications. Four exploitation actions are planned already: application of the prototype risk observatory for P4; development of the next generation dashboard in P5; development of a bio-vest to be worn by the research subjects within P6; and development of a prototype composite part with fibre-metal laminates and polymers for P7.

As for the collaborative projects (P1-P2), Piers underlined that the biggest result is the approval of FSS2, the second phase of the Programme. In addition, the coordination activities amongst EREA institutes are progressing in terms of exchange of personal and research, which will be put in place in 2018. Finally, there is a fruitful circulation of inputs between the EREA board and Future Sky Safety.

## 2.3. Presentations

### 2.3.1. P3 Specific solutions for runway excursion accidents

**Peter van der Geest** (NLR) provided the first two technical presentations, illustrating P3's progress.

First, van der Geest gave an **overview of the project**, presenting its general objectives:

- improving methods for analysing aircraft ground control on slippery runways under crosswind;
- quantifying the impact of water/slush covered runways on braking performance for modern tires and anti-skid systems;
- developing new methods to identify veer-off risk using operational flight data;
- exploring new concepts for prevention of excursions and reduction of consequences of runway excursions.

Then, he illustrated the activities performed in the four research areas the project covers: aircraft ground control on slippery runways under crosswind; braking performance on flooded runways; identification of

veer-off risk using operational flight data; and new concepts to prevent and reduce consequences of excursions.

Finally, he shortly presented the expected products for P3: new data and tools for certification of transport aircraft on flooded runways; new technologies to reduce runway excursion risk; and new tools to be used in flight data monitoring.

In his second presentation, on the **Reconstruction of cross and tail wind components from flight data**, **van der Geest** presented the work performed as part of the development of new methods to identify veer-off risk using operational flight data.

Crosswind is a factor in 24% of veer-off occurrences. Based on this, P3 moved from two research questions: can we use flight data to estimate surface wind components during the critical phase of the landing? And what accuracy can we achieve? If the answers to these two questions prove satisfactory, can we monitor cross wind exposure from flight operational data to monitor critical events and trends?

Van der Geest illustrated the requirements needed to accurately determine the surface wind components (cross- and tail-wind components), and why we cannot use existing parameters to obtain an accurate representation of the instantaneous wind during the landing phase.

After explaining the research performed by P3, van der Geest concluded that:

- For determination of instantaneous cross- and tailwind during the landing phase, neither METAR-data, nor FMS-wind are well suited;
- ADIRS-wind is near instantaneous, but without sideslip correction and low sample rate (cross/tailwind accuracy = ~3 kt resp. 4 kt);
- Instantaneous wind can be reconstructed from flight data parameters, compensating for bias-errors and sideslip with fair accuracy (~2 kt);
- Reconstructed cross- and tail-wind can be used to monitor actual encountered wind conditions in relation to applicable limits or guidelines.

**Frédéric Barbaresco** (Thales) provided the last presentation for P3, illustrating the **new technologies the project is developing to reduce runway excursions**. Barbaresco introduced the main factors impacting the braking distance (to full stop). As there are many of them, P3 is working on a combination of concepts (both airborne and ground) aiming at reducing runway excursions by having a more complete view of the runway condition and by providing a forecast of runway conditions. Pre-requisites to this imply collecting huge quantities of data from various systems, creating a database with complementary information and then combining the two concepts in order to use weather prediction to predict runway conditions.

After illustrating past concepts used to prevent runway excursions, Barbaresco showed how P3 is going further, and the ground solutions it developed:

- Ground Runway Excursion Alert & Warning System based on Big Data Analytics & AI;

- Predictive BD and ROT concept;
- Big Data Techniques;
- The water depth prediction model.

However, Barbaresco also highlighted that crew training, airborne equipment and airport systems have already reduced occurrence of runway excursions, but as the “zero risk” does not exist, we now have to focus on reducing consequences as the way forward to improve safety. The future lies in safety nets protecting stakeholders regardless of outside conditions. Recent models predict where accidents can happen in a much more precise manner; therefore, mitigation measures should be placed in a strategic manner to prevent consequences when likelihood is increased. A challenge remains open with respect to the cost borne by the airport for the benefit of the airline.

To conclude, Barbaresco presented an overview of airborne solutions, like the Landing Assessment, a system that provides to the pilot all information for approach phase preparation; and two concepts to reduce risks of runway excursion.

The first one, CORSAIR, provides on-board and aircraft based computation of Braking Action, providing a reliable, timely, objective runway condition evaluation means consistent with aircraft landing performance. A feasibility study has demonstrated the viability of this technology over 6 years of development.

The second one is a concept to prevent runway veer-offs during operations under crosswind: the crosswind landing controller. It is conceived as an on-board system for crosswind operations using steerable main landing gear to touch-down in crabbed motion and providing pilot assistance system to automatically perform de-crab after touchdown on ground, keeping the aircraft on runway centreline, and allowing manual steering inputs by pilot. So far, Future Sky Safety performed the following work: adaptation of A320 simulation model (main gear steerability); development of assistance system; implementation in motion-based full-flight-simulator; and simulator study with pilots.

Key points related to the cross-wind landing controller:

- It appears that better classification in landing operations is linked to more joined recordings of flight mode (manual, auto-land...) and tracks with associated detailed conditions in vicinity of the airport.
- There is still to explore and control a large set of scenarios: A/C type, A/C weight, air temperature, pressure, speed at threshold, touchdown place, slope and friction along the track, head and cross wind, targeted exit, exit speed, settings (slat/flap, auto-brake, thrust reverser).
- Due to the weak occurrence of abnormal cases, many simulated landings are required to produce accurately these cases for each triplet [A/C, runway, set of (extreme) conditions].

### 2.3.2. P4 Total system risk assessment

**Joram Verstraeten** (NLR) provided a short overview of the project, its technical progress and results on the **development of the Risk Observatory** and the possibilities for future exploitation.

P4 works to develop a prototype Risk Observatory (RO) as an enabling tool for safety management, and a risk assessment framework integrating risk assessment models specifically developed to represent a certain domain. The RO will acquire, fuse and structure safety data (which can include data from normal operations) and translate it to actionable safety information. The risk observatory targets analysts and managers in different domains, such as operators, ANSPs (Air Navigation Service Providers), manufacturers, airports and authorities.

During the first year of the project, P4 performed a series of consultations and desktop research useful to draft first requirements for the Risk Observatory; then, requirements were translated into an early prototype to be discussed with end users. The software prototype is the first important achievement of the project.

In the second year, the project worked to shift from domain specific risk models to an integrated risk assessment framework. Risk models calculate risk by estimating a probability of an occurrence with a certain severity. An estimate of risk is valuable safety information, but these models are often specific for one domain, e.g. ATM (Air Traffic Management) or manufacturer. The Risk Observatory, instead, aims at being of interest to a diverse group of users from both authorities and service providers.

In year three and four, P4 is working on perfecting its first “look and feel” prototype to achieve a fully functioning prototype, with proper functional design and software architecture. In the end, this will lead to an actual software that will include a graphical user interface and background systems to manage data. Also, the core of the risk observatory, i.e. the risk assessment framework that integrates risk assessment models specifically developed to represent a certain domain, should be available.

**Sylvain Metge (AIRBUS) provided the second presentation on the risk dashboard and on the development and integration of the Aircraft Safety Model into the risk observatory.**

The purposes of the risk dashboard are:

- To get an overall risk picture by plugging and running models from several domains instead of considering individual models;
- To estimate the impact of a risk mitigation action;
- To perform sensitivity risk measurement to the risk contributors.

In order to do so, the risk dashboard should manage interacting safety models using data from various sources. Therefore, the Risk Observatory needs to be structured in a way that allows to “plug” different types of models from several contributors of the different domains (e.g. aircraft/system manufacturers, aircraft operators, ANSPs). P4 uses the “Backbone Model” to integrate safety results from all the different domain specific models.

Metge then illustrated the Aircraft Safety model, which will produce two types of results: qualitative results, given by the shortest combinations of technical failures & flight crew errors leading to a dangerous situation; and quantitative results.

Finally, Metge concluded with the lessons learnt:

- The Backbone Model does allow the integration of domain specific models; it also integrates ground system contributors, operator errors, airborne systems, and considers the influencing factors;
- The same approach was used for the Mid Air Collision Risk;
- Probably, there is the possibility to apply the Backbone Model approach to any type of risks (controlled flight into terrain, runway incursion...).

Some challenges are still open:

- Integration and collection of data; managing in a consistent way different units of quantification; managing consistency amongst various domains
- Integration of collected data into the models
- Take into account the impact of common cause failures across various domains
- Manage in a consistent way the classification scheme over the various domains
- Manage in a consistent way several units of measurement used for quantification (per flight hour, per controlled flight hour, per operational hour...)

To close P4's sessions, **Fábio João Oliveira** (CEIIA) presented the **Risk Observatory software development and implementation**. The objective of this effort was to develop a prototype of the Risk Observatory that embeds the integrated risk framework and populates it with data for safety monitoring in order to obtain risk pictures for the total aviation system. Behind this, there was a high-level development process.

It started with establishing the users' requirements for the Risk Observatory (RO), collected in various ways, e.g. with questionnaires and interviews.

Then, the process to design an early prototype began in order to decide what the RO should look like. The early "look and feel" prototype came out of this process, addressing the needs and wishes of end-users and the requirements identified in WP4.1. P4 tested acceptability of the prototype with stakeholders, using specifically developed example use cases.

After that, P4 derived a preliminary system architecture by the questions the stakeholders posed. The RO is an analytical tool that analyses data, and P4 took as examples software on the market to include data integration tools, data visualization tools, and so on. Some features were kept in mind when deriving the system architecture, as the need to ensure functional and interface descriptions; to allow each organization to customize the product; to integrate and harmonize different data from different domains and stakeholders into a standardized data model, and so on.

The next step was functional design, needed to tell designers what to develop and how. All the previous work was further developed and especially the system architecture; the functional design also defined the workflows, the user and system interface, the data inputs and outputs and the procedures for operating the observatory. The functional design will also define the connection between the risk assessment framework and aviation data, serving as a basis for the actual software development.

The final stage will be software development for a Risk Observatory able to collect, protect and integrate external raw data to ensure data aggregation and system interoperability, making raw data accessible and standardized; and to develop tools for data quality assurance and data integration.

In the end, the software will respond based on what the user wants to achieve, processing the data in a different way. A large part of the software is already deployed and implemented; now, P4 has to prove this as a concept.

### 2.3.3. P5 Resolving the organisational accident

**Barry Kirwan** (Eurocontrol) introduced P5, a project seeking to **resolve the organisational accident**, which is very likely to be a component of the next aviation accident.

To achieve its ambitious objective, P5 had to address many challenges:

- How do you ensure safety leadership from the top?
- How do you ensure organisational focus is on the right issues?
- How do you maintain safety focus through the middle?
- How do you ensure rapid sharing of safety intelligence at the sharp end?
- How do you ensure the right safety and just culture?
- How do you work together with other organisations in a major crisis?
- How do you include all of this in your Safety Management System?

P5's research tries to answer these questions.

In the area of Safety Intelligence, P5 performed a study to explore how 16 aviation industry senior executives use safety intelligence to make safe business decisions. This led to the publication of the white paper "Keeping the aviation industry safe. Safety Intelligence and Safety Wisdom", a study that exposes some of the "wisdom" employed in identifying business decisions that protect safety, with the hope of supporting safety wisdom across the industry. P5 needed to get through the top managers as this is the only way to ensure that findings go into practice; however, as Kirwan underlined, as middle managers are managers of managers they may be an unexplored resource for safety. Currently, we do not know how they manage safety or what they think about it; therefore, in order to explore this, P5 contacted 28 middle managers in 2016 and another 20 in 2017, involving them in semi-structured interviews for thematic analysis. Although P5 could not give them each other's information, they were willing to come together and exchange directly their experiences. This exchange led to a model that served as guidance to all middle managers.

Under the research area of Safety Mindfulness, P5 has worked with an airline and an ANSP to design an App enabling ATCOs to post, update, and retrieve safety-related information useful to help them perform their daily tasks and activities safely. The App responds to the question, who are you going to call if you saw something unsafe? How can you tell someone that something unsafe has just happened?

Concerning the Safety Culture research area, P5 conducted a survey in collaboration with the European Cockpit Association; more than 7000 pilots from 32 airlines replied. The results of the survey received wide press coverage, even if the average article misunderstood the findings as "pilots fly when tired". As

the survey concluded, instead, on average Safety Culture is quite good. There is, however, a worry on fatigue amongst pilots as they are concerned fatigue is affecting their performance; in addition, perceived organization support is not so good: more than half the pilots surveyed feel their companies do not take the fatigue issue seriously. Finally, the survey shows that on average Cargo and Low Cost airlines, and those pilots on unsecure contracts, generally had poorer safety culture and performed worse.

In order to deepen its research, P5 needed to get together Air Traffic Controllers, airlines, airports and aircraft engineers, all focusing on a single airport: 15 organisations are now in the “Luton airport safety stack”, a joint effort for safety improvement undertaken by organisations based in Luton airport, meeting every few months to work around just culture and safety culture. The Luton stack already obtained results regarding working procedures.

The Agile Response Capability research task found that there is a need to exercise for managing crises, with the main objectives of building a know-how on how to manage these situations and running simulations to test reactions. The ultimate scope is to have different organisations involved in airport management working together effectively in a crisis. In order to do so, we need to move from individual competence to organizational resilience and to create appropriately challenging exercise situations useful to increasing efficient and effective learning opportunities. In the end, experience gained through exercising and learning from actual crisis events will lead to a better preparedness and crisis management, managing and mitigating adverse events that could impair safety.

Kirwan concluded his presentation by illustrating the work P5 is doing on advanced Safety Management Systems (SMS) with the scope of setting standards of excellence for SMS.

**Nick McDonald** (Trinity College Dublin) presented the **Mindful Governance in aviation**, illustrating the results of P5’s three-year research activity on the **safety mindfulness concept**.

Organisational Mindfulness is a key concept in resolving the organisational accident. It focuses on the role of people at the operational sharp end: in fact, operators are a unique source of critical information about normal operations, and key recipients of intelligence about operations. This idea is at the heart of the original conception of safety mindfulness of Weick and Sutcliffe that, however, is not operationalized as a practical and effective approach. Aviation, being an ultra-safe industry, does not offer so many incidents to learn from; therefore, it is important to pay close attention to what is happening in everyday operations and to learn from them. In addition, we have to consider that organisations find it difficult to implement recommendations from their safety investigations and risk assessments. A scientifically sound evidence base for both of these features is lacking.

The Safety Mindfulness concept is now a very clear and credible concept: what is not clear is how to implement it. The Operational Mindfulness Model shows that mindfulness is more than just a state of mind, but rather consists of gathering information and have them flow in order to raise awareness and take appropriate action.

The Mindful Governance Model is not only about thinking of organisational principles and designing a system that works, but even more on supporting people in what they have to do. Therefore, P5 developed software applications to operationalize and evaluate the new mindfulness concept in two full-scale operational case studies. These software applications are of two types: reporting any issue from normal operations and generating narratives for circulation and comment, and implementing improvement in an accountable manner.

The Case Studies involve the MUAC ATC Centre (Netherlands) and Alitalia Ground Operations (Italy).

Research with the MUAC ATC Centre demonstrated the need for the gathering and circulation of potential risk-related narratives amongst air traffic operational staff in order to heighten safety mindfulness in this ultra-safe sector, ensuring effective feedback loops of relevant information into the operation. The case study has been designed, the software prototype developed and the trial implementation phase is planned to commence following the final preparation meetings that took place in October 2017. Full implementation trials are provisionally planned for the first quarter of 2018.

Alitalia is using a big data approach: “big data” risk pattern analysis of audit reports identified poor pre-turnaround briefing as a precursor of other operational failures, which in turn were associated with actual safety incidents. This has initiated a case study centred on improving turnaround briefings and mindful performance. It will deploy two applications designed to create a mindful improvement initiative:

- An Implementation Manager that supports a collective improvement effort and effective handover across implementation phases;
- Operational reporting to ensure continual information flow and feedback as the initiative continues.

Currently, there is a strong commitment from both MUAC and Alitalia to test, validate and implement the software during 2018. Implementations trial will have to:

- Demonstrate proof of concept, i.e. the overall validity of the concept, to ensure that the concept actually works in practice in a normal operation and validate the functionality and usability of the software applications;
- Include the integration of the application into the host’s IT and operational environment;
- Provide training, usability assessment, final adjustment and debugging;
- Validate and evaluate the software.

For sure, P5 has to provide evidence of this via a full trial of its scientific and industrial impact. An evaluation metric (the mindfulness survey) has been developed to assess the penetration of the concept of Safety Mindfulness in the day-to-day experience of those involved in or affected by the case studies.

Exploitation potential is wide: it may be applied not only to all sectors of aviation, but also to all industries that carry a significant operational risk, including health and social care, emergency services, financial services and other transport modes. The applicability of these ideas across these domains has been demonstrated through teaching and research at master’s level with risk, safety and change professionals

across these industries, though no formal market analysis has yet been done in advance of the initial concept demonstration in the current case studies. Full trial implementation is key to provide powerful evidence of the exploitation potential of FSS Safety Mindfulness model and outputs both in aviation and wider afield.

**Carlo Valbonesi** (Deep Blue) closed the session illustrating the work done on the **Safety Dashboard**. The dashboard is a tool that safety managers can use to present results to their directors.

First, Valbonesi introduced the concept of Safety Intelligence. Eurocontrol defined safety intelligence as “the ability of people in management positions of an organisation to make good decisions about safety”. Three components make up Safety Intelligence: social competence (keeping safety central in the interactions with other people), safety knowledge (having access to information that makes sense about the safety performance of an organisation) and problem solving (understanding the problem and generating ideas to solve it). These components are all necessary for Safety Intelligence to be solid.

P5 wants to understand how to support Safety Intelligence in a way that helps those at the top to make good decisions on safety. Therefore, it came out with the idea of using dashboards, i.e. “cognitive tools that improve your “span of control” over many business data, helping people visually identify trends, patterns and anomalies, reason about what they see, help guide them toward effective decisions”. In other words, a dashboard is used to “tame” a lot of information for the user, in a way that it can be more easily used to make decisions. A Safety Dashboard supports all the three components of safety intelligence: mainly safety knowledge, as the Safety Dashboard provides information needed to understand what is going on in terms of safety. However, it supports problem solving as well, providing thresholds and trends needed to see whether a critical point is being approached. It also supports social competence, as dashboards are used to start conversations around safety.

Valbonesi presented the work done so far with ANSPs as a first step. P5 performed a survey with a Safety Dashboard User group composed of safety directors and managers, through in-person interviews and a workshop in Rome. The goal was to understand how safety managers design dashboards that their executives use. P5 found that most users have static dashboards that are the result of putting together information coming from the most different sources: just one had a quite advanced system for querying databases and coming up with charts and graphs. From here, P5 designed the “ideal dashboard” for executives. In order to do so, attendants, divided in groups, listed the indicators felt as more needed; the recurring ones were selected for the design of a prototype dashboard. This work was useful to start from the user needs to answer the question: as a safety manager, what is the most important information I want to discuss with the board when sitting at the quarterly meeting?

A first version of the Safety Dashboard was presented at the FSS Public Workshop in March 2017 in Brussels. Meanwhile, interactions with the user group continued in order to validate the prototype. All this work found endorsement from the Eurocontrol Safety team. Two meetings with the user group are planned for January and March 2018 to further refine and validate the safety dashboard. The goal is to have at least 4 ANSPs that start using the prototype Safety Dashboard at Executive Board level, in order to

then feedback the lessons learnt to other ANSPs. A presentation of how the safety dashboard works in its current, second release followed.

Finally, Valbonesi presented the current strand of work aiming at serving the needs of a stack (i.e. a joint undertaking of several organisations working at the same aim). P5 is currently developing an airport stack dashboard for the Luton stack, which found the prototype dashboard interesting. The project collected needs for building the airport dashboard; two prototypes of the dashboard have been issued and discussed with the Luton operators already.

Overall, P5's achievements so far include:

- The interest the Safety Dashboard received from Eurocontrol, where the Dashboard was not imposed but raised genuine interest;
- The interest it raised in the Luton Stack and the agreement found with the Luton stack on sharing their safety data;
- The visual prototypes developed as a starting point for discussion.

There is still some uncertainty on some fundamental points and some future challenges to address. P5 has to answer questions regarding:

- Who are going to be the main users;
- What data can be shared and what cannot, and which are the boundaries for sharing safety data;
- What will be the frequency of updates;
- How to reconcile the user-centred approach to the dashboard with implementation constraints, e.g. technological and budget constraints;
- The fine-tuning of the collaboration process with the stack.

Overall, P5 needs to streamline the mass of information, and to come up with common requirements accepted by all the organisations.

#### 2.3.4. P6 Human Performance Envelope

**Barry Kirwan** (Eurocontrol) introduced P6 and the **Human Performance Envelope**. The project had a series of objectives to achieve:

- Defining the Human Performance Envelope (HPE)
- Conducting preliminary experiments (includes selecting and assessing sensors)
- Conducting first flight simulator experiments (including validating the HPE and the sensors, and identifying performance decrement limits)
- Developing new HMI to recover performance
- Conducting second simulator experiments (including validating new HMI)

The HPE was defined during a workshop in April 2015: agreement was found to focus on Workload, Stress and Situation Awareness as the main factors of the HPE in the simulator experiments. The metaphor of the HPE comes from the flight envelope: just as if you push an aircraft outside the envelope it does not fly/crashes, if you push humans over their boundaries, they fail.

Therefore, P6 conducted exploratory simulations to look for the edges of the human performance. For ATCOs, this means for example they are not able anymore to process what they are seeing on their screen; however, it is not a single factor but a combination of factors that is going to crash your plane. Preliminary experiments took place at ONERA and Cranfield University in October 2015 to develop the simulator scenarios, fine-tuning them with project members, pilots and Human Factors experts, and to select and assess the sensors for measuring the different factors.

First Simulator Experiments in A320 DLR flight simulator AVES involved 10 Lufthansa crews and employed nine scenarios with varying workload, stress and situation awareness. The challenge was trying to find objective measures of the internal status of the pilot. P6 used some subjective measures as well as eye tracking; performance data were collected along with physiological data. In addition, P6 conducted debriefings and a cognitive walk-through of critical situations (to analyse the mental representation of the pilots before, during and after a critical situation).

Determination of Recovery Measures led to identifying performance decrement limits and necessary HMI improvements. New HMI presents information about the limitations of the aircraft, the operational consequences of the limitations and the available options. New HMI were integrated in Thales Avionics 2020 Cockpit Simulator.

A second set of simulator experiments with the advanced cockpit took place at Thales in October 2017 and involved 20 pilots from Lufthansa (first officers flying A320). The simulations used the same aircraft model as in first simulator experiments (A320), the same scenario (approach into Bremen with technical failure in complex situation), the same captain and measurements. Although complete results will be available only in March 2018, it was clear that pilots really liked the new HMI, but would like better if it were implemented tomorrow.

**Jim Nixon** (Cranfield University) presented next, aiming to answer the question **can we exploit technology to measure the human performance envelope?**

Nixon described the aircraft performance envelope and the changes in interface design. Aircraft today are much more sophisticated than in the past but, although the aircraft knows more than it lets on, it does not know about the state of the crew.

Therefore, P6 tried to find a way to measure the state of the crew, keeping in mind that such a system needs to be continuous, unobtrusive, reliable and acceptable to the crew and the operation. For example, it cannot be a helmet on the scalp as it is not acceptable for the crew. Luckily, technology provides a hand and many miniaturised devices (wearable technology, not looking like a medical device) exist that are able to measure electrical signals from the heart, ECG and EEG; eye tracking glasses and depth-sensing cameras are also spreading. Of course, this technology will have to be validated to establish how reliable these measures are, and parameters will have to be set to say when the performance is degraded; but we will probably end with having too much data and not knowing how to interrogate it. It is crucial, then, to try to understand what we could infer from these measures.

Next, Lufthansa pilot **Carsten Schmidt-Moll** presented the simulator research and **development of new cockpit interfaces**. His presentation tried to answer the question **do pilots get the information they need when they need it?**

Recently, due to a change in the aviation industry there has been an increase of workload for pilots: larger aircraft fly into smaller airports; there is pressure for reliability of the schedule (independent of weather and time of day); and airlines operate with less extra fuel. As industry is changing, surely a new interface is needed. But, what interface?

Schmidt-Moll presented a scenario with a normal flight and then an abnormal procedure. In the normal approach, the pilot flies supported by the ATC. In the abnormal procedure, the pilot flies supported by the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM), operational manuals come into play (and additional documentation is provided on the EFB (Electronic Flight Bag), a tablet or notebook used by the pilot, crucial for flight safety), new landing performance calculation is needed as well as a new approach briefing. This leads to the pilot monitoring the flight.

In an easy scenario of management of the abnormal procedure, there would be no interruptions, no other ATC conversation, no distraction by the cabin crew, no turbulence, no distracting noises, extra fuel for 60 min and no decision making by the Captain (Pilot Flying). In a not-so-easy scenario, all of the above is not granted and, in addition, time is running out. Surely, a new interface could come in hand.

Schmidt-Moll focused on New Cockpit Interface, saying that improvements are needed.

In particular, the format (position in the cockpit and type of information provided) of the low fuel warning makes it go easily undetected by pilots, while instead this warning is crucial for the aircraft safety. Instead, fuel should be into the Primary Flight Display (PFD), which is now not the case; in addition, the remaining flight time should be provided in minutes, not in kg, as this requires calculation for the pilot, wasting time and increasing workload.

Then, Schmidt-Moll argued that although manufacturers do not recommend skipping a procedure, and although operational manuals say that "in any case, the basic procedures must be followed", they do not support pilots in easily apply those procedures.

Again, Schmidt-Moll highlighted that new HMI are required for out-of-the-box scenarios, but a different approach is needed, as right now pilots do not get the important and relevant information.

The Electronic Flight Bag, crucial for flight safety, should be further exploited as:

- It is a library of over 30 different operational manuals and over 70 computer based training programs;
- Includes company news, duty roster, safety bulletin;
- Includes a performance calculation tool, a complete briefing tool (weather, NOTAMS, etc.) and different additional tools (dictionary, converter, etc.);
- Provides electronic communication (email, all reports) and route manual with maps and charts;
- Has a flight and fuel efficiency program.

On the other hand, it requires frequent updates than can be an issue for pilots.

To conclude, according to Schmidt-Moll simulator research did show that Cockpit interfaces must still improve in different areas:

- Information must not be spread across different documents (e.g. ECAM, OM-B);
- Warnings and cautions must correspond to the severity of the risk;
- Relevant information must be in a usable format (e.g. remaining fuel in minutes);
- Relevant external data must be made available for decision making (e.g. weather conditions);
- Physiological data does not help pilots as it does NOT refer to actual risks;
- Pilots' electronic flight bag must also be considered relevant for flight safety.

### 2.3.5. P7 Mitigating the risk of fire, smoke & fumes

**Eric Deletombe** (ONERA) introduced P7, providing an **overview of the project**. The rationale behind it is that 50% of fatalities in case of aviation accidents are fire caused/related, and about 300 fatalities a year could be avoided if fire fatalities were suppressed.

In recent years, risks of fire are increasing with the adoption of new hybrid/electric aircraft because their design has more electric parts and uses more organic composites than before. In addition, there is limited knowledge on the fire and heat behaviour of composites materials: few test results are available with regards of mechanical properties of material above 200° and of toxic smoke and fumes, as tests are quite expensive and industrial tests are often confidential.

P7 aims at increasing safety by:

- Improving knowledge concerning OMC materials and structures behaviours vs. fire;
- Assessing mechanical properties of heating/burning/degraded materials;
- Evaluating the fire consequences (including toxicity and smoke), and proposing solutions to mitigate them;
- Sharing database for future modelling purposes;
- Establishing/giving design recommendations.

A specific task, “WP7.1 Understanding and characterising the fire behaviour of primary structure composite materials (epoxy resins, standard CFRP)”, aims to increase knowledge of fire behaviour and performance of CFRP primary structure materials by producing a comprehensive experimental database on a reference material (T700GC/M21). Then, P7 aims to share results within the European research community and confront experimental results to state-of-the-art models and simulation tools. Deletombe reported the finding of WP7.1 about the physico-chemical and mechanical properties of T700/M21 after fire exposure, showing an important decrease of the mechanical properties and no more rate effect. As for the residual fire or mechanical properties of T700/M21 panels, reporting of results from post impact fire testing is still in progress.

“WP7.2 Improving material solutions to mitigate fire, smoke and fumes in cabin environment (plus toxicity)” aims at enhancing passengers' safety by developing and assessing new solutions at material and structural levels that mitigate risks of fire, smoke and fumes in the cabin. This has to be done in a way that

meets current industrial safety requirements, and using standard experimental methods and state-of-the-art simulation tools. Leonardo provided the requirements and specifications for tests and specimens, defined based on industrial state-of-the-art and applicability, and ensuring compliance to certification rules. P7 defined material characteristics to measure during the test, and almost all the tests have been performed.

Currently, P7 is gathering material characteristic data and flame penetration test results, evaluating material models and simulation tools (flame penetration), with respect to standard and new cabin material solutions, and evaluating the industrial applicability of materials defined in the project, in order to define/reformulate new standard aeronautical fire tests.

P7 tested different materials, including geopolymer materials, studied by the Czech Aerospace Research Centre (VZLU) through different tests (FS&F tests, mechanical tests) which also take into account comments from the previous workshop. DLR is exploring material characterisation of unidirectional CFRP and quasi-isotropic FML. Compression tests are currently in progress, and required the construction of a test stand for testing the compression properties under simultaneous fire exposure (CuFEx). Tests are under progress for FML, GPL and CFRP. Combination of natural fibres (flax) and recycled carbon fibres with Geopolymer Matrix (GPL) are being tested as suggested in the previous workshop, and are currently under progress.

WP7.3 studies the “effects of new materials, technology and fuel systems on the on board air quality” with a focus on safety, exploiting opportunities offered by latest technical developments. Recently, several questions concerning the impact of new materials on the on-board air quality, consequences of the use of new material in conditions of elevated temperatures and the issue of cabin fumes (health concerns) emerged. WP7.3 performed a literature study identifying a working definition of “Cabin Air Quality” (CAQ) and exploring environmental control systems (ECS) to manage cabin air, potential contaminants and sources, methods of monitoring air quality, current standards and performing a comparison with other enclosed environments (e.g. International Space Station or submarines).

New concepts of sensors were candidate to studying and/or monitoring Cabin Air Quality based on different criteria and building on real-time commercial sensors that are becoming less expensive in time. New sensors are smaller and cover a wider range of contaminants, but repeatability of results is still a challenge and a correct sampling strategy is required. P7’s third presentation further explores this topic.

P7 developed a Test Bench Concept (a possible WP7.3 product) and an Air quality test procedure for composite materials to investigate the feasibility of monitoring system with low cost sensors. This is the topic of P7’s second presentation.

Deletombe closed the first presentation with an overview of the dissemination actions performed by P7, including presentations in 5 international conferences, the organisation of a mini-symposium and the participation in one OPTICS project dissemination event, which reached more than 1000 people. The project will submit several papers in 2018. Exploitation measures include building a prototype demonstrator to show the technologies developed and tested in WP7.2. It will be made of two curved

panels attached to each other by connectors, representing the inner (interior) and outer (fuselage) shell of an airplane.

Eric Deletombe also presented the work performed by ONERA on the **characterisation of the thermo-mechanical behaviour of CFRP under high temperature conditions**, on behalf of Julien Berthe and Cedric Huchette.

**Burn-through resistance of aircraft structures.** P7 performed burn-through tests to assess the fire behaviour of composite materials. Unlike some metallic structures, composite structures generally do not experience burn-through until after 4 or 5 minutes of fire exposure; however, better understanding of complex physical phenomena is needed to get better safety margin management and anticipate next fundamental issues.

**Composite ply properties.** Influence of the temperature increase showed that in carbon/epoxy composite material temperature dependency is due to the epoxy resin and may affect in-plane loadings (both compressive properties and shear properties).

The objective of WP7.1 is to understand and characterise the fire behaviour of primary structure composite materials, thus enhancing knowledge concerning the fire behaviour and performance of CFRP primary structure material. The aim is to produce a comprehensive experimental database on a reference composite material (T700GC/M21), sharing the results within the European research community and confronting experimental results to state-of-the-art models and simulation tools. The proposed approach used both classical (standard) and new test protocols.

**Classical Test Protocols** (DMA, TGA, DSC) were performed to study:

- The influence of the temperature on the composite material's thermo-mechanical and thermo-chemical response.
- The influence of high temperatures on the quasi-static tensile properties of composites in all directions.
- The high velocity impact response of composite panels.

Then, P7 designed, developed and put in place **New Test Protocols** to investigate:

- Pyrolysis of composite materials using a laser based heating system.
- Influence of the temperature on composite compressive properties in the fibre direction. High temperature compressive tests on unidirectional ply were performed: P7 developed a specific compressive testing set-up for high temperature compressive tests on unidirectional ply, to ensure correct loading conditions.
- Influence of temperature and strain rate on tensile properties in the shear direction. High temperature tensile shear tests were performed: P7 developed a specific testing set-up for high temperature tensile shear tests.

- Influence of temperature on the tensile properties of composite materials in the fibre direction. INJECT (INternal Joule heating for thErmo meChanical characterisation) was used to study high heating ramp, using digital cameras (visible or infrared).
- Influence of the high temperature (by Joule effect) on toughness properties, for fracture toughness analysis under high temperature conditions.
- Flame-wall Interaction Research Experiment (FIRE), to study fire/flame effects on panels.

Deletombe then illustrated the **test results of thermal & thermo-chemical properties of composite materials**, which served to produce a comprehensive experimental database on the reference material (T700GC/M21). The protocol to prepare charred sample materials and the methodology of investigation implied conducting independent experiments to isolate a single (set of) parameter(s), as numerous input parameters are required for physico-chemical and thermo-mechanical models (here for T700/M21).

Deletombe illustrated the results of the **thermo-chemical kinetics and energetics** analysis, which employs:

- Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC);
- Thermo Gravimetric Analysis (TGA) at different heating rates (BLADE);
- Global kinetics model developed using Arrhenius reaction rate equations.

Deletombe then explained the **test results on the mechanical properties of virgin materials**, with specific regard to:

- The influence of the temperature on the tensile properties in the fibre direction.
- The influence of the temperature on the tensile properties in the transverse direction. High temperature on static tensile test and transverse loading showed a high influence of the viscous behaviour for transverse loading.
- The influence of the temperature on the composite material tensile mechanical properties in all directions.
- The influence of the temperature increase on the compressive properties in all the directions: high temperature compressive tests on unidirectional plies show huge variation of the mechanical properties with the temperature increase.
- The influence of the temperature and the strain rate on the tensile properties in the shear direction: high temperature tensile shear tests show influence of strain rate and temperature on the shear behaviour.

Finally, Deletombe illustrated the **test results on the mechanical properties of charred materials & panels**, exploring:

- The residual mechanical properties of the T700/M21 carbon/epoxy composite material after degradation were studied; an experimental protocol was required to prepare charred sample materials.
- The definition of an experimental protocol to prepare charred sample materials was based on the hypothesis that slow isothermal decomposition in a furnace is needed for homogeneous decomposition.

- A multi-physics characterisation approach was required to study the residual mechanical properties after degradation. P7 performed all the tests and analyses, which showed an important decrease of the mechanical properties and no more rate effect.
- A general methodology was established for the analysis of combined mechanical and fire loading during the life cycle of the composite structure. The methodology comprised three steps: first, the tyre debris impact on a composite panel; then, a post-impact damage analysis is performed; then, the fire test follows.
  - The above analysis also required an experimental setup for the tyre (an aircraft tyre from Michelin France) debris impact on a composite panel. The impact was loaded with a gas gun. Deletombe showed the test video.
  - Post-impact damage analysis was performed with a pulsed thermography. Results show that at V=150 m/s there is almost no damage; at V=170 m/s some damage is located in the surface ply; at V=186 m/s damage and delamination across the thickness occur.
- Fire tests were conducted on the impacted panels (T700/M21 panels, provided by CEiiA) to study their residual fire resistant properties:
  - Flame/composite interaction photographs on the exposed side
  - Thermal response on the back surface by quantitative IR thermography
  - Back surface deformation measured by Digital Image Correlation to detect delamination onset and growth
  - Mass loss measured during fire exposure
- All impact tests were performed, but the analysis is still in progress.

To conclude his second presentation, Deletombe outlined the status of P7 as follows:

- WP7.1 “Understanding and characterising the fire behaviour of primary structure composite materials” has currently reached its objectives of producing a comprehensive experimental database of a reference composite material (T700GC/M21).
- A significant number of methodologies and results are now available for thermo-mechanical characterisation of composite material from the virgin state to the degraded one.
- WP7.1 deliverables provided data on T700/M21.
- Model analysis is currently in progress.

Ricardo Reis (Embraer) provided an **overview of issues and future directions on Cabin Air Quality**. Air cabin is a complex matter and even its definition was not clear at the beginning. As established by P7, an acceptable working definition is “the holistic (physical, chemical, biological, radiological) characteristics of cabin air”. As such, it concerns health, safety and comfort, and comes to a cost for companies.

Different factors influence Cabin Air Quality and the perception of related issues: world and industry trends affect it, as do problems related to smoke and fumes in the cabin and the possible impact of new materials. In addition, it relates to passengers’ comfort and to the increased awareness on air quality due to the increasing availability of sensing monitoring and reporting devices.

As for the safety and health concerns on fumes and odours, P7 reviewed results from an EASA Study (2017) and from the REACH project (ending in 2019). Preliminary results of the EASA study show that CAQ is better than in other indoor environments, and there are no causal links between fumes events and health. A new large scale study by DG MOVE/EASA was launched in 2017, focusing on abnormal events.

About passengers' comfort, the subject relates to the necessity of improving filtration and odour removal, and pressure and humidity level. Reis highlights that in recent years there is a change of perceptions about odours: the "new car smell" is not appreciated anymore and defence against outside pollution is a feature of new Tesla and Volvo cars.

On-board continuous monitoring will require an interface with the aircraft and physical interfaces for sensors and operation, and a data repository. The repository could pose a problem regarding governance and business model. The question whether this should be on airlines or institutions is open.

It is also important to involve passengers in future scenarios, as on-board monitoring is an increasing reality.

Studies on new materials and substances, used in the aircraft structure, for thermal and acoustic isolation, in furnishing and so on, are required as well, as many new types are coming in use, including composite materials, nano-materials, meta-materials and flexible electronics components. Therefore, modelling and testing for aging and release, as performed by WP7.3, are crucial.

To conclude, Reis highlights that:

- There are different lead initiatives to clear doubts on on-board contaminants;
- Research shows good CAQ so far, but doubts linger;
- World trends point to increased pressure on the aviation system;
- New technology for filtering and sensing are more and more available;
- Introduction of new materials seems robust, but could be improved.
- Potential new challenges lie in the introduction of nanotechnologies.

### 2.3.6. Wrap up

FSS Programme Manager Michel Piers (NLR) offered a wrap up of the workshop, closing the event.

In addition to summing up the main achievements of each technical project, Piers highlighted how the workshop succeeded in providing the audience with a thorough overview of what the programme is doing globally. Piers underlined that all the projects are making good progress and stressed the importance of the next FSS Public Event to spread the results achieved to a wide audience.

## 2.4. Dissemination material

One of the main objectives of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Internal Workshop was improving consortium awareness of projects' progress and potential for future exploitation.

**Project:** Dissemination, exploitation and communication  
**Reference ID:** FSS\_P2\_DBL\_D2.13  
**Classification:** Public



Therefore, at the registration desk each participant received a copy of the Future Sky Safety handout produced for the 1<sup>st</sup> Public Workshop, so to have a quick overview of all the projects within FSS.

In addition, in order to raise participants' awareness on the status of the technical projects, a poster session was open to projects willing to contribute. In the afternoon of the first day of the workshop, FSS Programme Manager Michel Piers guided a poster tour in collaboration with the authors, so that each poster received a fair amount of attention.


Posters displayed during the workshop can be found in Appendix C.

### 3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 3.1. Conclusions

Overall, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Future Sky Safety Internal Workshop was successful and fully achieved its objective of providing the audience with a thorough overview of what the programme is doing globally and what are the next steps.

Nearly 40 people attended the event, including representatives of each project (see Figure 4) and three representatives of EASA.



**Figure 4: Representation of Future Sky Safety projects at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Internal Workshop**

Each presentation raised interesting questions, with several interventions from the participants to discuss the technical aspects of the projects presented. Also the poster session was very well received, with the full audience attending the guided tour.

#### 3.2. Recommendations

After the workshop, some recommendations can be made for the future FSS Public event.

Each presentation raised the interest of the audience, leading to many questions and discussions. It is recommended that a large amount of Q&A time slot is planned for the next Workshop.

With respect to P2 activities, recommendations are related to the production of dissemination material tailored to the event, as they were well received during all the events organised by Future Sky Safety. In addition, participants suggested that communication of the next Public event should be given fairly in

**Project:** Dissemination, exploitation and communication  
**Reference ID:** FSS\_P2\_DBL\_D2.13  
**Classification:** Public



advance, in order to allow for the invitation to circulate properly, and for the participants to save the date in their agendas.

## Appendix A LIST OF PARTICIPANTS TO THE 2<sup>ND</sup> INTERNAL WORKSHOP

<i>N.</i>	<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Organisation</i>
1	Al-Tayawe	Abubaker	Cranfield University
2	Amato	Marcello	CIRA
3	Apostu	Emilia-Alexandrina	EASA
4	Barbaresco	Frederic	THALES AIR SYSTEMS
5	Bogos	Stefan	INCAS
6	Charles	Rebecca	Cranfield University
7	Chatzialekou	OURANIA	EASA
8	Chira	Alina-Ioana	INCAS
9	Deletombe	Eric	ONERA
10	Emelianov	Denis	TsAGI
11	Ferraiuolo	Vera	Deep Blue
12	Friedrich	Maik	DLR
13	Greene	Graham	CAA
14	Grimm	Ferdinand	Technical University of Munich
15	Hamelijnck	Regine	EASA
16	Kirwan	Barry	EUROCONTROL
17	Kos	Johan	NLR
18	Krajenski	Volker	German Aerospace Center (DLR)
19	Lamiscarre	Bruno	ONERA
20	Marchante Rodriguez	Veronica	Cranfield University
21	Martaus	Frantisek	VZLU
22	McDonald	Nick	Trinity College Dublin
23	Metge	Sylvain	AIRBUS
24	Moitas	Mónica	CEiiA
25	Nixon	Jim	Cranfield University
26	Oliveira	Fábio	CEiiA
27	Piers	Michel	NLR - Netherlands Aerospace Centre
28	Quintiaes	Marta	Embraer Portugal, S.A.
29	Reis	Ricardo	Embraer Portugal, S.A.
30	Ribeiro	Bernardo	CEiIA
31	Schmidt-Moll	Carsten	Lufthansa
32	Strelkov	Vladimir	TsAGI
33	Toader	Adrian	INCAS
34	Valbonesi	Carlo	Deep Blue
35	van der Geest	Peter	NLR - Netherlands Aerospace Centre
36	Verstraeten	Joram	NLR - Netherlands Aerospace Centre
37	Vozella	Angela	CIRA
38	Wang	Chong	Technical University of Munich

**Appendix B** 2<sup>nd</sup> Internal Workshop Presentations

**Appendix B.1** “P3: Prevention of runway excursions” – Peter van der Geest, NLR



## Presentation overview

- Project objectives
- Project results
- Expected products



## General P3 Project Objectives

- Improve methods for analysing aircraft ground control on slippery runways under crosswind;
- Quantify impact of water/slush covered runways on braking performance for modern tires and anti-skid systems;
- Develop new methods to identify veer-off risk using operational flight data;
- Explore new concepts for prevention of excursions and reduction of consequences of runway excursions.

**P3 hopes to contribute in avoiding these events....**




## **Aircraft ground control on slippery runways under crosswind**

Activities:


- Analysis of aerodynamics under high sideslip angles on the ground;
- Analysis of aircraft yawed tyre dynamics on flooded runways;
- Models and analysis for dynamic interaction between aircraft/pilot and ground reactions

## Aerodynamics under high side slip



- Important for crosswind landings;
- Mainly simulations;
- Limited analysis of experimental data.

## Example experimental data regional jet



# Aircraft yawed tyre dynamics on flooded runways



Aircraft test tyre



Tests on flooded surface



# Simulator versus desktop simulations



## Desktop simulations



Different assumptions on wind and landing gear modelling

Crosswind limits for slippery runways

validation

6DOF pilot-the-loop trails



Flight Operating Manual

## Braking on flooded runways

### Activities:

- Analysis of available test data;
- Additional aircraft flight tests on flooded runways;
- Use data for model development / improvement of existing models for braking friction.

## Flight testing on flooded runways

### Water pond used for testing



## Test aircraft used

**Cessna Citation**



**Airbus A400M**




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11 January, 2018 | 12




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## Citation results versus regulatory models



## Example of results by new models



## veer-off risk using operational flight data



### Activities:


- Identification causal factors in runway veer-offs;
- Identification of available and useable data;
- Development of new algorithms for flight data analysis.

## Algorithms developed so far




- Method to derive accurate crosswind just before touchdown (separate presentation);
- Method to accurately estimate rate of descent at touchdown;
- Method to accurately determine lateral position during ground roll.


## Example rate of descent analysis



## Histogram analysis of ROD at TD



## Example lateral position during ground roll



## reduction of consequences of excursions

### Activities:

- Inventory of current developments and new initiatives;
- Feasibility study and definition of R&D needed for implementation of identified new concepts;
- Assess impact of the new concepts on reducing excursions.

**Further details on work accomplished on new technologies to be discussed in next presentation by Frédéric Barbaresco**

## **Expected products from P3**

- New data and tools for certification of transport aircraft on flooded runways;
- New technologies to reduce runway excursion risk;
- New tools to be used with flight data monitoring.



## Consortium

Stichting Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium  
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt  
Office national d'études et de recherches aérospatiales  
Centro para a Excelência e Inovação na Indústria Automóvel  
Centro Italiano Ricerche Aerospaziali  
Centre Suisse d'Electronique et Microtechnique SA  
Institutul National de Cercetari Aerospatiale "Elie Carafoli"  
Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial  
Výzkumný a zkušební letecký ústav, a.s.  
Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut  
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation

Civil Aviation Authority UK  
Airbus SAS  
Airbus Operations SAS  
Airbus Defence and Space  
Thales Avionics SAS  
Thales Air Systems SA  
Deep Blue SRL  
Technische Universität München  
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft  
Service Technique de l'Aviation Civile  
Embraer Portugal Estruturas em Compositos SA

Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute TsAGI  
Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo Spa  
Boeing Research and Technology Europe SLU  
London School of Economics and Political Science  
Alenia Aermacchi  
Cranfield University  
Trinity College Dublin  
Zodiac Aerosafety Systems  
Institut Polytechnique de Bordeaux  
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij  
Sistemi Innovativi per il Controllo del Traffico Aereo


<http://www.futuresky.eu/projects/safety>

Future Sky Safety has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under Grant Agreement No 640597. This presentation only reflects the author's view; the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

**Appendix B.2** “P3: Reconstruction of cross- and tailwind components from flight data” – Peter van der Geest, NLR



The slide cover features the European Commission logo on the left and the Future Sky Safety logo on the right. The title 'Reconstruction of cross- and tailwind components from flight data' is centered in blue text. Below the title is a blue horizontal bar with the text 'FUTURE SKY SAFETY – 2nd Consortium Workshop , 2017'. The central image shows a white commercial airplane flying against a clear blue sky. At the bottom left, the text 'SAFETY | FUTURE SKY' is displayed in red.



The slide content features the Future Sky Safety logo in the top right corner. The title 'Presentation overview' is centered in blue text. Below the title is a bulleted list of four items: Introduction, Determination of cross- and headwind, Accuracy in practice (FDM), and Conclusions.

## Context



Work performed as part of:

### P3 – Solutions for Runway Excursions

- Development of new methods to identify veer-off risk using operational flight data

Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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## Research questions



Crosswind is an important factor in veer-off occurrences:

- In 24% of veer-offs crosswind is a factor

Research questions:

- *Can we use flight data to estimate surface wind components during the critical phase of the landing?*
- *What is the accuracy that can be achieved?*

*If satisfactory: can we monitor cross wind exposure from flight operational data to monitor critical events and trends?*

Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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## Requirements



Determination of surface wind components (cross- and tail-wind components):

- Instantaneous wind, during the last 20 seconds before touchdown
- Corrected to a single height (10 m AGL)
- Accuracy: ~ 2 kts

## Why not use existing parameters?



- FMS-wind: typically moving-averaged over 30 seconds and not-corrected for sideslip
- IRS-wind: typically 2 s LP filtered, not corrected for sideslip, minimum accuracy 12 kt, low sample rate (0.25 Hz)
- METAR-wind: 10 minutes averaged, recorded per half hour

=> None is clearly suited as an accurate representation of the instantaneous wind during the landing phase.


## Reconstruction from flight data

### Basic parameters

- Ground Track ( $\chi$ )
- Heading ( $\psi$ )
- True Airspeed ( $V$ )
- Ground speed ( $V_g$ )
- Sideslip angle ( $\beta$ )

$$V_{W_{cross}} = V \sin(\chi - \psi - \beta)$$


$$V_{W_{tail}} = V_g - V \cos(\chi - \psi - \beta)$$



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

## Impact of neglecting sideslip

- Significant effect on crosswind
- Limited effect on headwind



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

## Min. Performance Requirements (ADIRU, Arinc738)

Parameter	Max Filter Bandwidth (Hz)	Max Transport delay (Msec)	Resolution	Accuracy (95%)	Units
True Airspeed	2	110	.0625	±4	knot
Groundspeed	2	110	.125	±12	knot
True Heading	2	110	.0055	±4	deg
True Track	2	110	.0055	±5	deg
Flight Path Angle	2	110	.05	±4	deg
Wind speed	2	110	1	±12	knot
Wind Direction	2	110	.7	±10	deg

Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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## Accuracy of wind components based on minimum performance specification

Accuracy ( $2\sigma$ ):

Wind speed: ~12 kt


Crosswind: ~14 kt

Headwind: ~12 kt

Dominant error sources:

Crosswind: HDG and TF

Headwind: Vg and TAS



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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## Actual accuracy?

Accuracy spec is minimum requirement!

What can be expected in operational practice?

Analysis based on available flight data:

- Modern regional jet
- Approaches to runway 27 at Schiphol
- 396 cases (in 2009)
- Quick Access Recorder Data (41 parameters)
- Sample rate recorded ADIRS-wind .25 Hz, basic parameters 1 Hz

Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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## Flight data analysis

Objective: analyse flight data to estimate actual accuracy of the basic parameters (Heading, Track, True Airspeed & Ground speed)

How?

By comparison with independent other parameters.

Title of presentation, date

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## True Airspeed (ADC)

True Airspeed is directly related to:

- Impact pressure ( $q_c$ ), relates to CAS (from ADC)
- Static Pressure ( $P_s$ ), relates to Pressure Altitude PA (from ADC)
- Static Air Temperature, SAT (from ADC)

TAS can be directly reconstructed from recorded CAS, PA and SAT.

## Example TAS reconstruction

Error estimate (all runs)


Bias:  $\mu=1.5$  kt

Random Noise:  $\sigma=.6$  kt

⇒ Accuracy

(95% of observations)

2.7 kt (< 4kt)



## Groundspeed (IRS)



Groundspeed can be derived as time derivative from GPS position, but..

- GPS position is recorded at .25 Hz
- Derived Groundspeed can become noisy due to differentiation
- Noise can be reduced by appropriate filtering method

Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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## Example Ground Speed reconstruction




Error estimate (all runs)

Bias:  $\mu=0$  kt

Random Noise:  $\sigma=1$

⇒ Accuracy

~2 kt ( $\ll$  12 kt)



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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
## Heading (IRS)

No direct other reference for Heading is available.

Alternative method devised based on knowledge of Landing runway heading.

### Hypothesis:

Mean A/C heading = RWY heading  
During ground roll



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data


17

## Impact of crosswind

Hypothesis incorrect!  
Due to crosswind effect:

On average  
0.8 degree tyre slip per  
10 kt crosswind

Estimated heading  
accuracy:  
~1 deg (< 4 deg)



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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## Track Angle (FMS)

Track Angle can be derived from:

1. Subsequent GPS coordinates
2. ILS Localizer deviation

Ad 1) Low sample rate (.25 Hz) and low resolution (~2 deg), noisy

Ad 2) Possibly affected by ILS characteristics (e.g. beam bends)

## Example Track Angle reconstruction



Error estimate (all run)

Bias:  $\mu=0$  deg

Random Noise:  $\sigma=0.55$  deg

⇒ Accuracy

~1.1 deg (< 5 deg)



## Reconstruction of Sideslip Angle



Sideslip Angle is not recorded, but can be reconstructed from measured signals:

$$\beta = \frac{C_y - (C_{y\delta_r} \delta_r + C_{y_p} p \frac{b}{2V} + C_{y_r} r \frac{b}{2V})}{C_{y\beta}}, \text{ where } C_y = \frac{W}{.5\rho V^2 S} n_y$$

This requires:

- Rudder deflection  $\delta_r$
- Yaw rate  $r$  and roll rate  $p$
- Lateral load factor  $n_y$


Plus corresponding stability derivatives

Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

## Example sideslip reconstruction



With fair estimate of Stability derivatives a good approximation of sideslip angle during decrab can be made!!



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

## Estimated error due to actual signal inaccuracies

Bias  $\mu$


- Crosswind: ~0 kt
- Headwind: ~1.5 kt

Std. Dev.  $\sigma$

- Crosswind: ~1.5 kt
- Headwind: ~1.2 kt

Accuracy (95%)



- Crosswind: ~3 kt
- Headwind: ~4 kt



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

## Actual difference between ADIRS and reconstructed wind

Matches fairly well with theoretical results.




Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

## METAR data vs. reconstructed wind



METAR data matches well with flight data, but... with significant outliers.



Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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## Conclusions



- For determination of instantaneous cross- and tailwind during the landing phase, neither METAR-data, nor FMS-wind are well suited
- ADIRS-wind is near instantaneous, but without sideslip correction and low sample rate (cross/tailwind accuracy = ~3 kt resp. 4 kt)
- Instantaneous wind can be reconstructed from flight data parameters, compensating for bias-errors and sideslip with fair accuracy (~2 kt)
- Reconstructed cross- and tail-wind can be used to monitor actual encountered wind conditions in relation to applicable limits or guidelines.

Reconstruction of surface wind components from flight data

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**Appendix B.3** “P3: New technologies for reducing the risk of runway excursions” – Frédéric Barbaresco, Thales Group



FP8 Future Sky Safety Project / WP3.4  
 F. Barbaresco

### Braking Distance (to full stop)

**Main factors impacting Braking Distance**

- Approach Speed** → Kinetic Energy
- Runway state** → Friction Coefficient
- Auto-Brake:** → High/Medium/Low → (BTV)
- Targeted Exit Taxiway** → Coordinated with controller / Not coordinated with controller
- Pilot Skills for Braking** → Company dependent
- Braking process:** → Aerodynamics / Reverse Engine
- Clearance of Taxiway** → Taxiway traffic
- Cross-Wind conditions** → Pilot in the loop to compensate (differential braking)
- Aircraft Tire wear**
- Runway Gumming**

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## CONCEPT COMBINATION

RAIN RATE + WATER DEPTH + ON-BOARD AND AIRCRAFT BASED COMPUTATION OF BRAKING ACTION

**Description**

**Past**



**Prediction**

The diagram illustrates a process flow from historical data to future predictions. It starts with 'Weather and airfield condition reporting (Thales)' and 'Runway Contaminant Prediction & Wind along Runway (Thales)'. These feed into 'Modeling of water flow and prediction of water depth on runways (STAC)'. The STAC model uses inputs like 'Climate file', 'Slope angle', 'Moisture', and 'Runway'. The output is 'Water accumulation on runway' and 'Runway condition'. This leads to a 'Correlation data base. To predict performance once same condition is predicted'. The final outputs are 'Current Runway condition relative to aircraft performance' and 'Runway condition relative to aircraft performance prediction in 30min'. A target icon is shown next to the 30min prediction.

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## GROUND SOLUTIONS (Thales Air systems)

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## Experimentation@CDG: LEOSPHERE Lidar & Météo France X-band Radar

**Bande X Météo France**

**Lidar Transmission characteristics**

- Vertical beams : 56° wide cone, 5 beams
- Low altitude : [40m ; 200m]
- High resolution : 20m default altitude resolution





**LIDAR**

## Experimentation@CDG





P1 55 ICAO types, 22575 movements  
 P2 46 ICAO types, 33620 movements

ZNRW Zone Northern Runways														
ICAO	Type	Class	Traffic	HF TC										
ICAO	Type	Class	Rate	HF TC										
204480	A319	NR3432	Landing	20.8	0.200	179.0	7.20	180.0	2.0	105.2	5.30	3.91	4.08	1.0304
203760	A319	DU1000	Landing	11.1	0.600	180.0	8.70	180.0	5.8	109.8	9.20	9.31	6.42	0.6876
004640	A319	NR344P	Landing	11.1	0.200	180.0	11.20	180.0	7.8	180.3	12.00	9.15	9.31	0.6776
103880	A319	NR3460	Landing	12.0	0.200	180.0	11.20	180.0	7.8	180.1	12.68	9.39	9.88	0.5822
193000	A319	NR311L	Landing	8.0	0.200	200.0	12.68	300.0	7.8	280.3	18.18	11.08	11.31	0.5300
006560	A319	NR324	Landing	11.4	0.600	180.0	9.70	180.0	6.0	180.1	9.27	6.36	6.46	0.5561
004200	A319	NR323	Landing	11.3	0.600	200.0	9.80	200.0	2.8	200.0	9.70	9.30	9.22	0.5332
000000	A319	NR320	Landing	7.8	0.600	180.0	13.20	200.0	8.7	201.2	10.38	10.14	10.20	0.5208
004200	A319	NR320	Landing	11.0	0.600	180.0	9.00	200.0	3.1	200.3	9.70	9.13	9.29	0.4940
004340	A319	NR340	Landing	11.0	0.600	200.0	8.00	227.0	3.1	229.3	8.80	3.17	3.32	0.4770
003840	A319	DU1000	Landing	12.0	0.227	200.0	8.00	180.0	3.0	180.0	5.52	3.91	4.30	0.4705
000000	A319	NR313	Landing	8.0	0.400	180.0	9.20	180.0	3.4	180.3	5.76	4.30	4.31	0.4556
713000	A319	NR313	Landing	11.0	0.400	180.0	9.20	180.0	2.0	228.3	4.49	9.13	9.15	0.4504
004200	A319	NR313	Landing	14.0	0.600	200.0	8.00	220.0	3.7	240.4	4.35	9.27	9.38	0.4470

## Stats : ROT on Landings A318-A320-A333-A388







**27R**  
**09L**







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## Stats : ROT on Landings B737-B77L-B752-B763



**27R**  
**09L**





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


## Stats : Exit Taxiway per A/C type






- Z3 and Z6 are mostly used (70%), except for A388
- A388 prefers the next farer taxiway (Z2, Z7) (>60%)





## Stats : ROT focus on the most frequent A/C



- ROT histogram depends on A/C type and on airport configurations (Westward or Eastward). It is little bit larger and staggered for Westward
- Less than about 3s between successive exits (500m distant) shows that each landing has one targeted TWY exit.





# Big Data Techniques

## Data reduction/transformation strategies

- Standardization (Transformation)
- Normalized Principal Component Analysis (Transformation/Reduction)
- Regularization (Reduction)
- Recursive feature selection (Reduction)

→ **Tuning** process by Cross-Validation within the Training set


## Predictive Algorithms

- Regularized Logistic Regression
- K Nearest Neighbors
- Support Vector Machine
- **Random Forest**
- **Adaboost**
- **Gradient Boosting**

Algorithms	Strategy	Train Score	Test Score
Regularized Logistic Regression	Standardization Regularization	0.487	0.5
K Nearest Neighbors	Standardization	1.0	0.595
SVM	Standardization Regularisation	0.732	0.527
Random Forest	Not Necessary	0.954	0.603
AdaBoost	Not Necessary	1.0	0.616
Gradient Boosting	Not Necessary	0.998	<b>0.637</b>


→ Random Forest Confusion Matrix

		Predicted classes				
		1	2	3	4	5
Real classes	1	9	17	2	0	0
	2	3	24	10	0	0
	3	0	9	18	4	0
	4	0	3	10	9	0
	5	0	0	0	0	28




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
### Speed reconstruction for an A320 on 09R/27L with normal weather




### Speed reconstruction for an A320 on 09R/27L with rain




### Speed reconstruction for an B77W on 09R/27L with normal weather




### Speed reconstruction for an B77W on 09R/27L with rain



### Speed reconstruction for an A388 on 09R/27L with normal weather



### Speed reconstruction for an A388 on 09R/27L with rain



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# GROUND SOLUTIONS (DGAC/STAC)




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## water depth prediction model

### Principles

- Modeling water flow lines from runway geometric and surface characteristics
- Calculate water depth from water flow model



Item	Reference	Remarks
1	...	...
2	...	...
3	...	...
4	...	...
5	...	...
6	...	...
7	...	...
8	...	...
9	...	...
10	...	...

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
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## Water depth evolution on pavement



Rain on a coarse surface Description:

- Initially, water fills up every asperities of the surface. Water depth increases until it reaches asperities height.
- When water depth exceeds asperities height, water runoff starts. Water depth increases until runoff rate equals rainfall rate. The water depth is then called surface detention.
- When rain stops, water keeps up flowing until a constant level corresponding to water trapped into surface asperities.
- Finally, water trapped, into surface asperities decreases by evaporation.




## water depth prediction model



### Flow lines Model

Determination of flow lines on element  $n_{ij}$

- Split up into  $n$  elementary elements
- Steepest slope and flow line determination on each element





### Experimentation Validation

Test site: Runway 18L/36R and taxiways of Lyon Saint-Exupéry airport



### Runway Mapping

### Continuity of flow lines




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## Experimentation Results of water depth prediction


$H_{Meas}$  : measured water depth  
 $H_{Cal}$  : calculated water depth


- Sensor DSC111 (Vaisala): 0 – 2 mm ( $\pm 0.01$  mm) and 7% of error above 2 mm
- GPS – submeter positioning





Weather station – data recorded every 6 mn





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## GROUND SOLUTIONS (ZODIAC)



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## Prevention can only take us so far

- The focus on occurrence reduction has been fruitful
  - Aerospace is very safe, runway excursions proportionally rare
  - Crew training, airborne equipment and airport systems have brought the industry to a very low rate of occurrence
  - The “Zero risk” does not exist
  - In spite of all efforts, runway excursions still occur frequently
- Mitigating the consequences is the way forward to improve safety
  - Current standards for runway strips and areas were defined in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century
  - In spite of those, excursions frequently result in human/material damage

## ZODIAC Overrun mitigation

- The future lies into “safety nets” that protect the stakeholders regardless of outside conditions
  - The bearing capacity of runway surroundings is greatly reduced in some conditions increasing damages
  - The “spirit” of arresting systems allows to have people and equipment safe
- Recent models predict where accidents can happen in a much more precise manner
  - Mitigation measures should be placed in a strategic manner to prevent consequences when likelihood is increased
  - The challenge of the cost borne by the airport for the benefit of the airline should be overcome
  - Ground based solutions decrease aircraft weight and are therefore greener.




# AIRBORNE SOLUTIONS (Thales Avionics)




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## Thales Landing Assessment




- System that provides to the pilot all information for approach phase preparation (predictive mode > 1500 feet)
- Main topics addressed:
  - Identify existing solutions which improve runway overrun systems based on runway contaminant detection automatically transferred to the aircraft.
  - Define the feasibility of a global solution, based on ground/on board systems collaboration, for an improved runway overrun protection
  - In coordination with ground system, develop an application to:
    - Improve pilot awareness of runway contaminant (with 30 min predictions) on a tablet
    - Integrate the application on PC environment (no integration within The Link environment)



Msg: D-ATIS, CPDLC ou SWIM

Thales Avionics



Propose assessment of the estimated braking condition of better anticipate potential alerting from the ROAAS safety net.

• Prepare landing phase based on 30 minutes prediction

# Thales Landing Assessment


## Technical solution :

The solution simulates onboard use of destination runway friction information reported by ATC

It is based on :

- Predictive solution hosted on an EFB tablet connected to avionics system :
  - Approach parameters coming from FMS (ground speed, weight, etc...)
  - Meteorological parameters of destination airport coming from weather system
  - Runway friction parameters


Flight crew performs a verification of landing capability before TOD on EFB tablet which presents the forecast runway contaminant (30 minutes prediction)



## AIRBORNE SOLUTIONS (Airbus)



# AIRBUS concepts to reduce risks of runway excursion



AIRBUS concepts to reduce risks of runway excursion


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## CORSAIR concept Onboard and aircraft based computation of Braking Action



### Description

- For contaminated runway, answer to the need for a reliable, timely, objective runway condition evaluation means consistent with aircraft landing performance
- Use the Aircraft as a Sensor
- Classified runway slipperiness with Braking Action on TALPA format as output
- Report the results to stakeholders (flight crew of landed aircraft, Airport Operators, Airline Operators)



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## CORSAIR concept

Onboard and aircraft based computation of Braking Action

### Feasibility study done

**Field Trial analysis**

- End-to-end chain demonstration
- Airlines demonstration started from winter 2016-2017
- Flight Tests



1-Landed A/C equipped with CORSAIR



Few minutes after...

GOOD TO MEDIUM



2-Incoming Aircraft

Previous PREP ACC: GOOD TO MEDIUM

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## AIRBORNE SOLUTIONS (DLR)



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## DLR concept for future prevention of runway veer-offs during operations under crosswind



### Idea

- On-board system for crosswind operations (currently landings)
- Using steerable main landing gear to touch-down in crabbed motion (such as B-52)
- Pilot assistance system to
  - Automatically perform de-crab after touchdown on ground
  - Keep aircraft on runway centreline
  - Allow manual steering inputs by pilot



### Application Area

- Future aircraft with tight geometric or controllability limitations, e.g.
  - Aircraft with high aspect ratio wings
  - Blended wing bodies / flying wings
  - Other unconventional aircraft configurations



### Performed work within Future Sky Safety

- Adaptation of A320 simulation model (main gear steerability)
- Development of assistance system
- Implementation in motion-based full-flight-simulator
- Simulator study with pilots

DLR.de  
• Slide  
37

## DLR Crosswind landing controller



- Under crosswind conditions runway excursions mostly veer-offs not over-runs → incidents / accidents under crosswind conditions mostly not due to inappropriate braking, but due to directional control problems
- Crosswind landings can end up in severe tyre or landing gear damages → not only safety critical but also an economical issue
- Major difficulty for pilots during landings under strong crosswind is *decrab*-manoeuvre → part of usual pilot's flying skills but sometimes challenging in case of gusts, contaminated runways etc.
- Solution: steerable main landing gears allowing touchdown in crabbed motion and automatic pilot assistance system



# DLR Crosswind landing controller



## Control concept



- Alignment of all landing gears with the runway before touchdown
- After touchdown directional control with nose gear
- Speed dependent decrease of crab angle with all landing gears (pure steering → no control)

## Ground track controller

- Speed dependent calculation of chase angle
- Chase angle as command value for nose wheel steering
- Based on localizer signal
- Manual steering input from tiller or pedals possible

## Crab steering

- Speed dependent, linear decrease of crab angle (crab angle equal zero at 30 kts GS)
- Crab steering with all landing gears



# Report



## Feasibility and definition of R&TD needs for implementation of new concepts

Author:

Short abstract: Future Sky Safety is a Joint Research **0202020** (JRS) on Safety, initiated by EASA, the association of European Research Establishments in Aeronautics. The **0202020** contains two streams of activities: coordination of the safety research **0202020** of the EASA member, and collaborative research projects on European safety priorities.

This deliverable is produced by the Project P2 (Future Sky) Main objective is Feasibility study **0202020** definition of R&TD needed for implementation of new concepts.

Programme Manager	GD-Nicola Pavia, NLR
Operational Manager	GD- Lambert Buijter, NLR
Project Manager	GD- van der, NLR
Grant Agreement No.	83327
Document Identification	D2.13
Status	Final
Version	1.0
Classification	Public

## Key points



### More data

17000 suitable ADS-B tracks have been analysed. Deceleration range is large enough within each phase: before touchdown, after touchdown, just before exit. Deceleration range is not notably affected by rain conditions and no abnormal case (full stop, excursion) was detected. So, it appears that better classification in landing operations is obviously linked to more joined recordings of flight mode (**manual, autoland,...**) and tracks with associated detailed conditions in vicinity of the airport.

### RW subdivision

The maximum braking achievable on successive runway intervals will be the basis for building a predictive alert. In accordance with this runway division, one has to explore and control a large set of scenarios: A/C type, A/C weight, air temperature, pressure, speed at threshold, touchdown place, **slope and friction along the track**, head and cross wind, **targeted exit**, exit speed, settings (**slat/flap, autobrake, thrust reverser**).

### Simulation (for abnormal cases)

Due to the weak occurrence of abnormal cases, a lot of simulated landings are required to produce accurately these cases for each triplet [A/C, runway, set of (extreme) conditions]. The computation could be done by means of landing sub-models like those presented above, in Airbus **CORSAIR** concept when correlating the stopping distance to RCC or in **DLR simulation (without CLAS)**. The interval length remains to be established according to meteorological data sampling (for example about 100m for X-band radar) and to the surface grid used in predictive **water depth model**. The A/C track reconstruction from ADS-B and the landing sub-models should be adapted to this division.

## Appendix B.4 “P4: The Risk Observatory” – Joram Verstraeten, NLR



# The Risk Observatory - P4

## Future Sky Safety - 2<sup>nd</sup> Consortium Workshop




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NLR - the Netherlands  
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
## Towards safer aviation



Source: EASA Preliminary Safety Review – 2017

## P4 - Objectives

- Develop a **prototype risk observatory** as an enabling tool for safety management.
- Develop a **risk assessment framework** that integrates risk assessment models specifically developed to represent a certain domain.



## P4 - Year two & three

From domain specific risk models

To an integrated risk assessment framework

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
## P4 - Year three & four

Look-and-feel prototype


Full functioning prototype

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## The RO and the risk assessment framework



## How a RO helps to achieve the safety goal

- Raise the bar
- Best use of resources
- Learn from your peers
- Tackle big concerns together





**Appendix B.5** “P4: Aircraft safety model. Development and integration into a risk observatory” – Sylvain Metge, AIRBUS

**Risk dashboard purpose**

- To get an overall risk picture by plugging and running models from several domains instead of considering individual models
- To estimate the impact of a risk mitigation measure
- To perform sensitivity risk measurement to the risk contributors

**How?**


- By means of managing interacting safety models using data from various sources



## Risk dashboard - Backbone model

### Backbone model - Principle

The backbone model **manages in a consistent way generic contributors and influencing factors leading to a global risk and the interface with domain-specific safety models**



**Precursors** – Hazardous situations as the exposure to a barrier or as a lack of barrier efficiency

4- Failure to manage stabilization in final approach

**Barriers** (e.g. Flight procedures in FCOM)



Safety functions or operational procedures meant to **prevent the failures and error propagation**

**Generic Contributing Factors** - Elements that contribute to the occurrence of a hazardous situation

**Influencing Factors IF** (e.g. Strong tail wind, Low flight crew performance, Contaminated runway...)

## Contributing factors

Elements contributing to the occurrence of a specific (safety) event.

- **Generic contributing factors** are defined for each risk.
- **Specific contributing factors** are specified for each domain. Each specific contributing factor is linked to the same generic contributing factor.

### Example of Generic contributing factors

4		Unstable approach
4.1		Excessive or unstable speed
4.2		Excessive or unstable lateral and vertical path
4.3		Excessive or unstable thrust
4.4		Late or inappropriate flaps/gear configuration
4.5		Inappropriate use of automation during approach
4.6		Absence of go around when unstable approach
4.7		Late destabilisation of the approach

Specific contributing Factors can either be **technical failures** or **human errors** as for example:

- Inappropriate traffic data information (technical cause)
- Communication issues – misunderstanding (technical cause and also human errors)

## Influencing factors



Element that may affect the frequency of occurrence of one or several contributor factors


- An influencing factor does not increase the safety severity associated to a given risk. It only **increases its rate of occurrence**
- An influencing factor **never directly leads to a risk** otherwise it would be a contributing factor
- Influencing factors are processed by the backbone model taking into account information included in the outcome of the specific models (i.e. the Minimal Cutsets)

### Examples of Influencing factors:

- Traffic density and complexity: high, medium, low
- Runway surface: Dry, Dump, Wet, Contaminated

Ref.	Influencing factors for RWY Excursion
<b>500</b>	<b>Runway characteristics</b>
500.1	Runway surface quality
500.2	Runway length
500.3	Runway width
500.4	Runway slope
500.5	Runway lighting
500.6	Runway Visual Path Guidance
<b>501</b>	<b>Weather</b>
501.1	Storms, rain, rainfall
501.2	Tailwind, headwind
501.3	Crosswind
501.4	Windshear / Turbulence
501.5	Ceiling - Visibility
501.6	Wake turbulence (note manageable in the models)
<b>502</b>	<b>Runway condition</b>
502.1	Runway state (contamination)
<b>503</b>	<b>Crew performance</b>
503.1	Flight crew experience
503.2	Flight crew fatigue
503.3	CRM
503.4	Crew response to failures


## Backbone model of RWY excursion - Precursors



Green boxes are "Precursors"

Hazardous situations as the exposure to a barrier or as a lack of barrier efficiency


### Simplified backbone model of risk of RWY Excursion




## Backbone Model & Domain Specific Models

The Backbone Model is used to integrate safety results from the domain specific models

Contributors from Domain Specific Models, incl. Influencing Factors



## Aircraft Safety model – 1/4



Structure of the Aircraft domain model:

- **Flight Phases** requiring flight crew actions
- **Flight crew procedures and tasks**
- **Aircraft Functions** used to perform the tasks.
- **External Factors** that influence the Aircraft operations

## Aircraft Safety Model – 2/4

### Model Based Safety Assessment


Components of the model are associated with safety automata that describe:

- **Technical Failures** attached to an Aircraft Function
- **Flight Crew Errors** attached to an operational procedure

The AltaRica Language and the Cecilia OCAS<sup>®</sup> Toolset were used to describe formally the model and to perform the safety assessment

*Cecilia OCAS is a toolbox developed by Dassault Aviation*



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## Aircraft Safety Model – 4/4

Each Aircraft failures are modeled in the AltaRica model by considering several 'failure' modes

The AltaRica model includes constraints automata to process the transition between a safe state towards several failed states



Failure modes are the standard ones used in the classic safety assessment tools

**Technical Failures** attached to an Aircraft Function

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## Aircraft Safety Model – 3/4

As for aircraft functions, each flight crew tasks are modeled in the AltaRica model by considering several 'failure' modes

Standard failure modes like "loss", "erroneous" used for technical failures are not adapted to crew behaviour  
 "Unexpected crew action", "Incorrect crew action" or "No crew action" are appropriate failure modes to reflect crew bad behaviour



**Flight Crew Errors** attached to an operational procedure

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## Safety Qualitative results

**Qualitative Results**  
 Shortest combinations of technical failures & flight crew errors leading to a dangerous situation → Example:  
 Aircraft Excessive Thrust at Touch Down

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**Appendix B.6** “P4: Total System Risk Assessment. Software Development” – Fábio Oliveira, CEIIA




# P4 - Total System Risk Assessment

## Software Development

Fábio Oliveira (CEIIA)




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



## Objectives

The objective of this effort is to develop a prototype of the risk observatory that embeds the integrated risk framework and populates it with data for safety monitoring in order to obtain risk pictures for the total aviation system.



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## High-level development process



1. **Risk Observatory requirements**
2. Risk Observatory design and early prototype
3. Preliminary system architecture
4. Functional design
5. Software development

## High-level development process



1. Risk Observatory requirements
2. **Risk Observatory design and early prototype**
3. Preliminary system architecture
4. Functional design
5. Software development

# Risk Observatory early prototype




“What is normal performance?”



What the stakeholders want

## How the Risk Observatory delivers



#	Best practices	Domain	Related event	Status
3.1	Analyze and highlight, especially during times of high OTIF	Active	Level bust	Encouraged
10.1	Use standard OTIF processing procedures and	ADP	Level bust	Encouraged
10.2	Do not use interventions	ADP	Level bust	Encouraged
4.7	Ask for more progress in all leading indicators (except during surveillance or previous order approaches)	ADP	Level bust	Encouraged

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# Risk Observatory early prototype



“Build momentum behind actions that will make a difference”



What the stakeholders want

## How the Risk Observatory delivers



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
# Risk Observatory early prototype

"We would like to prioritise hazards"



What the stakeholders want

## How the Risk Observatory deliver




# Risk Observatory early prototype

Ensure the interfaces are working together effectively"



What the stakeholders want


## How the Risk Observatory deliver





## High-level development process

1. Risk Observatory requirements
2. Risk Observatory design and early prototype
- 3. Preliminary system architecture**
4. Functional design
5. Software development

## Preliminary system architecture





## High-level development process



1. Risk Observatory requirements
2. Risk Observatory design and early prototype
3. Preliminary system architecture
- 4. Functional design**
5. Software development

## Functional design



The objective of the functional design is to further develop all the previous work, specially the system architecture, in order to define:

- Workflows;
- User and system interfaces;
- Data inputs and outputs;
- Procedures for operating the observatory.

This design will also define the connection between the risk assessment framework and aviation data.

It serves as basis for the actual software development.




## High-level development process

1. Risk Observatory requirements
2. Risk Observatory design and early prototype
3. Preliminary system architecture
4. Functional design
5. **Software development**

## Software development

### Data acquisition and integration


- Collect, protect and use actual safety data (including raw flight data (FDM)).
- Integrate external raw data into the Risk Observatory, while addressing the existing taxonomies and different measures and granularities, to ensure data aggregation and system interoperability.
- Development of tools for data quality assurance and data integration.



# Software development


## Data acquisition and integration

From raw data to aggregated/accessible/standardized data




# Software development

## Risk framework integration





## Software development Preliminary RO implementation




The screenshot shows the login page with fields for Email address, Password, and Remember me, and a Sign In button. The architecture diagram illustrates the system layers: Data Sources and Services at the bottom, followed by Virtualized Data Access, Data Layer, Semantic Layer, Advanced Analytics, Reports and Dashboards, Alerts, Actions, and Portal, and finally Users at the top. A box highlights the Alerts, Actions, and Portal components.

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## Software development Preliminary RO implementation




The dashboard displays various analytics: Traffic Stats (Monthly Visits), Stats (New Activations Today: 194, Device Crashes Today: 78), Customer Engagement (Purchased Device, Activated Device, First Session), and Active Users (7 Days, 14 Days, 26 Days). A map shows active users across Europe. A filter sidebar on the right allows for date, location, duration, and search unit filtering.

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## Software development Preliminary RO implementation



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## Software development Preliminary RO implementation



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**Appendix B.7** “P5: Resolving the organisational accident” – Barry Kirwan, EUROCONTROL



## P5 Resolving the Organisational Accident

ECTL lead, 167 MM, 10 Partners, 2015-2017, 5 WPs

- The next aviation accident is likely to have organisational components, e.g. poor safety culture, poor management decisions, or local actors taking risks when working under pressure, or a poor collective response to an accident by the industry.
- This Project seeks to redress this situation, resolving the organisational accident.


Intelligence	Mindfulness	Culture	Agile Response
			
Advanced SMS – Organisational Safety Capability			

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## Work Packages

- WP5.1 – Safety Intelligence (ECTL/Airbus)
- WP5.2 – Safety Mindfulness (TCD)
- WP5.3 – Safety Culture (LSE)
- WP5.4 – Agile Response Capability (FOI)
- WP5.5 – Advanced SMS (NLR)

## P5 Overall Architecture



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
## P5 Challenges

How do you ensure safety leadership from the top?

How do you include all of this in your SMS?

How do you ensure organisational focus is on the right issues?

How do you maintain safety focus through the middle?



How do you work together with other organisations in a major crisis?

How do you ensure rapid sharing of safety intel at the sharp end? (SM)

How do you ensure the right safety and just culture?

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
## WP1 Safety at the Top

Safety Wisdom: how 16 top executives manage a safe business



## Safety Wisdom II

- What to pay attention to? What to ignore? What needs a decision? What's around the corner?
- Phase 1 – 2017: 5 ANSPs develop guidelines
- Phase 2 – 2018: 9 ANSPs developing a working prototype





## Middle Managers – an unexplored resource for safety?

### Charting unknown waters

**PHASE 1: EXPLORATORY**

- 28 Middle managers
- Manufacturers, air traffic organisations
- January-December 2016
- Unstructured interviews  
Qualitative Content Analysis

**PHASE 2: EXPLANATORY**

- 20 Middle managers
- Manufacturers, airports, air traffic organisations, airlines, etc.
- January-December 2017
- Semi-structured interviews  
Thematic analysis

**Guidance – a white paper**

You just saw something unsafe... Who are you going to call?



## WP2 Safety Mindfulness

### A safety mindfulness 'app'




- Working with an airline and an ANSP
- An App has been designed, enabling ATCOs to post, update, and retrieve safety-related information useful to help them perform their daily tasks and activities safely.
- The App uses ©WordPress: <http://www.cihsmindfulness.com>
  - Small to large data management.
  - Open-source (i.e. low-cost installation, customisation and maintenance).
  - High level of security




## WP3 Safety Culture

- Major survey with European Cockpit Association : > 7000 pilot replies
  - Overall SC good, but some clear issues (e.g. fatigue)
- Survey with Airbus Design and Boeing Europe
- Surveys with *easyJet* and *Luton Airport*
- Survey with KLM
- Luton Safety Stack



## 32 airlines, 7200 pilots...



## Press coverage of survey (Dec 2016)


Press focused on the negative aspects such as Fatigue and atypical contracts.

Economist was the most balanced article (8<sup>th</sup> December)



## Company variations

(NB. Company ID varied per graph)



## Survey Conclusions

- Overall, the **average safety culture is good**. This was not a 'grievance survey'. However, standard deviations were high
- The most worrying result is **fatigue**. Pilots are concerned it is affecting their performance, and **>50% feel their companies do not take the fatigue issue seriously**
- Those pilots on **unsecure contracts, Cargo and Low Cost** airlines generally had poorer safety culture
- The EC, regulators, airlines and pilot associations need to consider the results and determine ways forward

- Colleague commitment to safety (4.06)
- Speaking up (3.85)
- Risk Handling (3.77)
- Procedures & Training (3.73)
- Just culture and Reporting (3.71)
- Communication and Learning (3.71)
- Collaboration and Involvement (3.60)
- Management commitment to safety (3.44)
- Staff and equipment (3.44)
- **Fatigue (2.82)**
- **Perceived Organisational Support (2.65)**

SAFETY | FUTURE SKY
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### The Luton Airport Safety Stack

Air Traffic Control  
 Airlines  
 Airports  
 Aircraft engineers

Luton Safety Culture Survey 2016


**Safety culture**  
is the way we address safety at work, affected by our shared values, perceptions and related behaviours.

**THE SURVEY**  
A range of companies at Luton Airport will take part in this survey (incl. flight crew, air traffic controllers, engineers & ground operations).  
The survey takes about 20 minutes and can be found here: <https://open.gftv.dhr>

The survey is **ANONYMOUS, CONFIDENTIAL & INDEPENDENT**

Contact details: [future.sky@london-luton-airport.com](mailto:future.sky@london-luton-airport.com)

12 organisations now working together on improving safety culture



HARMONISATION OF GROUND HANDLING STANDARDS

GROUND OPERATIONS MANUAL	GROUND OPERATIONS MANUAL
<p><b>LTN SAFETY STACK GOMS</b></p> <p><b>Cone Placement</b></p> <p>Aircraft parking on stand at LLA shall be coned for protection and indication to approach in the area of each cone. When the aircraft is safe to approach, cones shall be placed one metre in front of each engine, one metre from the further wingtip and behind the aircraft in all weather conditions. On General Aviation additional cones may be placed at the nose of the aircraft.</p>	<p><b>LTN SAFETY STACK GOME</b></p> <p><b>Actions Prior to Arrival</b></p> <p>Before the arrival of an aircraft on stand, a responsible person must:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct FOD check on entire stand removing all debris just prior to arrival.</li> <li>Make sure the stand surface condition is sufficiently free of ice, snow, etc., to ensure safe aircraft movement.</li> <li>Make sure all required Ground Support Equipment (GSE) is available and serviceable, and is positioned well clear of the aircraft path, inside marked equipment bays.</li> <li>Make sure the aircraft path and ramp area is free of persons, objects and obstacles which the aircraft may strike or endanger others due to jet blast effects.</li> <li>Make sure marshalling staff is present.</li> <li>Make sure additional ground personnel (such as wing walkers) are present (if required).</li> </ol> <p>Aircraft must not be marshalled onto stand before these actions are completed.</p> <p>In order to ensure that critical areas of the stand are clear of FOD and other contamination, the inspection path indicated on the drawing below should be followed.</p>



## Development of a LTN Safety Stack Dashboard

**Luton Stack Dashboard**  
last access 16/09/2017

Hi John! ▾

Select event:  | Select timeframe:  |

**A measure of near misses**

**Hotspot Map**

**Recent Notable Events**

29 Sep 2017  
Innocent groundwork...  
28 Sep 17  
Contamination - aircraft fuel...  
27 Sep 17  
Hold Point Stand...

**Results from latest audit on Air Ops**  
29.09.2017

Finding	Recommendation
Airport users unaware of parking restrictions.	Air Ops to use Points of Engagement to communicate the restriction and safety principles relating to it.
Equipment lay was too large, leading to aircraft to place two sets of steps in it.	Air Ops to remark steps to ensure correct parking.
Vehicle operator could not see passenger guidance personnel and had to brake abruptly.	Air Ops to use Points of Engagement to communicate correct passenger parking protocol and positioning.
Lined stopped from vehicle although it was secured using equipment.	Review of equipment and securing technique to be carried out by TSM and handling agents.

**Change Management**

Change	Timescale	Risk	Impact on operations
Construction of new taxiway	Ongoing, opening January 2018	Resurfacing of taxiway, removal of existing taxiway, new taxiway construction	Potential confusion for aircraft and staff on the airport.
Construction of new taxiway	Ongoing, opening January 2018	Live works on airfield	Turbine Screen construction during period 0600 to 0900 between 15/11/2017 and 16/11/2017.
Stand renumbering on East Apron	16/11/2017	Stands to be renumbered to allow for absorption of code D and C aircraft	Potential confusion for aircraft and staff on the airport.
Stand renumbering on East Apron	16/11/2017	Stands to be renumbered to allow for absorption of code D and C aircraft	Stands will be removed from service and returned to it with schedule and weather on the site.

**Looking forward**

Closure of stand 14  
Stand 14 will be closed between 11/10/2017 0600 and 16/10/2017 for essential drainage works. During the works, the stand will be bordered off and its red lights as there will be open trenches.

Winter Operations  
Air Ops is currently testing for volunteers to train in snow clearing for winter 17-18. Training is scheduled to take place weekdays 1100 to 1200 local. Please contact the OCM if you would like to get involved.


Wildlife Hazard  
During October we typically see large numbers of migrating birds flying close to the airfield. It is essential that FOD, especially food waste, is removed from the airfield so that wildlife is not attracted. Remove all FOD and waste, and always contact the OCM to report it if you are unable.

2018 20

Guess what we're going to do next...



16 January, 2018 21



## Raising our game



- Moving beyond "need to have regular exercises"
- Moving from individual competence to organizational resilience
- Creating appropriately challenging exercise situations
- Increasing learning opportunities of exercises and actual crises
- Enlarging the 'comfort zone' by gaining experience through exercising and learning
- More efficient and effective training and learning from exercises and actual crisis events
- Better preparedness and crisis management, managing and mitigating adverse events that could impair safety



## Fitting P5 products into SMS...

## SMS Standards of Excellence

- Interviews with a range of aviation organisations
- What is the future of SMS?
- How should SMS evolve?
- Evolution or Revolution?
- In SMS SoE, how do you get from Level D to E?
- Will P5 products help?

B. Safety by Design			
Design addresses the entire system, including the people, procedures, software and equipment. Evidence includes features to ensure safe operation and support the operator's decision-making process. Design sought to prove the success and failure case approaches.			
Answer	Justification (for each question, please provide justification for each question where you are scoring '10')	Evidence (please provide evidence for each '10' answer)	
<b>A</b> Safety is not explicitly addressed in the design process			
No Answer Required			
<b>B</b> Are there explicit processes to assess the effects of failure on the operation? In these instances that the explicit processes for assessing the effects of failure on the operation are used?	Blank		
When designing new procedures, software or equipment, does your organisation have a formal process by which it achieves a 'safe design' (i.e. potential for failure are assessed, controlled and/or mitigated) that may be used as a 'design safe element'?	Blank		
<b>C</b> When designing new procedures, software or equipment, does your organisation have formal processes for addressing failure that have been identified through assessment, investigation or safety cases?	Blank		
<b>D</b> When designing new procedures, software or equipment, does your organisation have formal processes to identify the effectiveness of improvements or safety according to test?	Blank		
<b>E</b> When designing new procedures, software or equipment, does your organisation assess benefits that have been achieved through its design processes?	Blank		
<b>E</b> Has your organisation met the 'P5 products for better' criteria, and are willing to share best practices with other organisations?	Blank		



*Safety  
 Operations  
 Engineering  
 HR & HF*

# Endgame

Better ways to identify and manage organisational risks



**SAFE PERFORMANCE SYSTEM**

ORGANISATION

- Safety Intelligence
- Safety Mindfulness

Senior Management

Middle Management

Operational, Engineering & support staff

Safety Culture

Agile Response Capability


- Air Traffic Control
- Airlines
- Airports
- Aircraft engineers



**TIME FOR QUESTIONS**

**FUTURE SKY**  
SAFETY

## Thanks for your attention



**Appendix B.8** “P5: Mindful Governance in aviation. A three-year research activity and outcomes” – Nick Mc Donald, Trinity College Dublin



## Mindful Governance in aviation

### A three-year research activity and outcomes

Nick Mc Donald  
Trinity College Dublin



## Organisational Mindfulness

Key integrating concept in resolving the organisational accident.  
Sense-making role of people at the operational sharp end.

- Unique source of critical information about the normal operation
  - What goes well and what could be improved
- Key recipient of intelligence about the operation
  - Operational actions informed by the most current, relevant information about potential risks

This circulation of information and knowledge is at the heart of the original conception of safety mindfulness of Weick and Sutcliffe

- Not operationalised as a practical and effective approach

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## Why is it important?





In an 'ultra-safe' industry it is important to pay close attention to what is happening in the operation

Organisations find it difficult to change and to implement the recommendations that come from their safety investigations and risk assessments.

A scientifically sound evidence base for both of these features is lacking

## Evolution of the Concept






## The functional model [1/2]

General Propositions	Model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Safety-critical narratives are generated from operational staff</li> <li>The information spreads to all users for attention and comment</li> </ul>	RELEVANCE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This 'knowledge in use' leads to better understanding of safe operational performance</li> <li>Safety-critical projects are initiated to enhance capability to remain safe</li> </ul>	LEVERAGE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information that is worth sharing supports planning and action by individuals across the system</li> </ul>	DISTRIBUTED AUTHORITY

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Making the 'knowledge – action – outcome' cycle transparent validates the knowledge and makes the actions accountable</li> </ul>	ACCOUNTABILITY
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aggregation of many operations, across boundaries, progressively addresses the direct or indirect risks that are perceived</li> </ul>	HORIZONTAL ESCALATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mindful safety action escalates accountability to all system levels –operational, tactical and strategic</li> </ul>	VERTICAL ESCALATION



## Mindfulness prototype software applications



- Generic prototype software applications have been developed to operationalise and evaluate the new mindfulness concept in two full scale operational case studies.
- These software applications are of two types:
  - Reporting any issue from normal operations and generating narratives for circulation and comment
  - Implementing improvement in an accountable manner

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## The OSMS metric

- An evaluation metric has been developed to assess the penetration of the concept of Safety Mindfulness in the day-to-day experience of those involved in or affected by the case studies.
- This mindfulness survey (OSMS) is designed to complement other evaluation metrics, including functional use of the particular tools and methods, as well as performance indicators related to operational safety.


## The Case Studies



## Testing and validating the model in real aviation contexts



- **Structured process**



- **Evaluation metrics**


- OSMS

- **Multiple-case study** method (Yin, 2012) – replicating the patterns increases the robustness of the findings

## Research to Date



2017



## (1) Overview of the MUAC case study



- There are **different means** through which MUAC spread relevant information and up-dates to the ATCOs
- The current system is designed to be **self-managed** – i.e. it is responsibility of the individual ATCO to read, understand, learn and apply the content contained in the communication means.



**ATCOs have less opportunity to discuss and share critical situations**

## A possible solution...



Tailor-made IT solution for ATCOs & Supervisors

- **Increase** MUAC collective safety mindfulness
- **Support** ATCOs continuous learning from peers' experiences and best practices



Gather critical stories/narratives, relevant to daily work, in which **experiences, recommendations, practices are shared and discussed** in an interactive way


## An App for safety mindfulness

- An App has been designed, enabling ATCOs to post, update, and retrieve safety-related information useful to help them perform their daily tasks and activities safely.
- The App uses ©WordPress:
  - Small to large data management.
  - Open-source (i.e. low-cost installation, customisation and maintenance).
  - High level of security



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The screenshot shows a WordPress blog page with the following elements:

- Header:** Includes the 'EUROCONTROL' logo on the left and 'Sample Page' on the right.
- Main Content:** A section titled 'Narratives' containing three post cards:
  - Never vector too close, especially if climbing/descending traffic is involved** by Tiziana C. Callari (14th June 2017) in Sector Y (0 comments).
  - Avoid callsign confusion** by fabio (14th June 2017) in Sector X (0 comments).
  - Overload due to thunderstorms** by fabio (14th June 2017) in Uncategorised (1 comment).
- Text Overlay:** 'Simple narrative structure', 'Opportunity to comment', and 'Overview of narratives' is placed over the bottom of the main content area.
- Sidebar:** Contains a search bar, 'Recent posts' (listing the three narratives), 'Recent comments' (listing a comment on the 'Overload due to thunderstorms' post), 'Categories' (a dropdown menu), 'Tags' (with buttons for 'callsign', 'overload', and 'thunderstorm'), and 'Archives' (listing 'June 2017').
- Footer:** Shows 'SAFE' on the left, 'CHS - TCD' in the center, and '18 | 18' on the right.

## (2) Overview of the ALITALIA case study



BIG DATA\* in Ground Ops in AZ (Naples and Rome 2016-2027)  
 Logistic Regression models (MaxEntropy Classifiers) to GO data:

- Low quality Turnarounds (9+ neg. marks per audit) **are 12 times** more likely to be carried out without **proper pre-arrival briefings**
- The **GO Safety Events** are **4 times more likely to occur for very negative Turnarounds** (more than 6+ negative marks per single Audit)

Model detected by logistic functions:

**No briefing → larger Neg Turnaround → ≥ .80 risk of GO event (Ground Handling Damage)**

\*based on complexity: a workflow between multiple databases was necessary to organise datasets



Table 2 - Risk Pattern for Daily Turnarounds

Imputation Number: 4

ID PTTN	Pre-Briefing	A/C type	Season	Predicted Response	Estimated Risk
				Category	Probability
141	Negative	ATR/Embraer	Spring	9+	,95
1	Negative	ATR/Embraer	Winter	9+	,91
125	Negative	Airbus/Boeing	Spring	9+	,88
273	Positive	Airbus/Boeing	Summer/Autumn	<= 1	,86
4	Negative	Airbus/Boeing	Winter	9+	,82
277	Positive	ATR/Embraer	Summer/Autumn	<= 1	,79
122	Positive	ATR/Embraer	Spring	9+	,67
Total	N	370	370	370	370




## GO to implement change program in 2018

TCD software: Improvement Manager


TCD software: Torrent Reporting

- Focus Groups in December 2017 / January 2018 on pre-briefing and first phases of Turnaround
- Turnaround Safety Bulletins
- Assess need for additional training & procedural change
- Torrent Reporting (Italian version) will replace the current GSR
- Simplify monitoring of ANY GO topic (MOR and Voluntary)
- Use Audio reporting to speed up process
- Change metrics
  - Usability, OSMS, audit findings, safety outcomes



Managing projects  
People involved  
Messages  
Comments & issues  
Handovers

Initiative	Phase	Description	Owner
Audit in Turnaround process, GO Fiumicino Airport	Plan	TBA	Fabio Matti




- Links into company data to populate contextual data
- Fulfills mandatory reporting requirement – GSR
- Simple narrative structure
  - Context
  - What happened? (Cause)
  - What outcome?
- Review reports and initiate improvement



	Case Study (1) MUAC	Case Study (2) ALITALIA
<b>Relevance</b>	Narratives & comments	Audit analysis plus reports
<b>Leverage</b>	Information influences action	Improved briefing influences action
<b>Distributed authority</b>	Circulation across operation.	All staff involved & supported
<b>Accountability</b>	Informed peer influence	Manage improvement process
<b>Horizontal escalation</b>	Only within ATM community	Focus on ground ops but can involve shared risks
<b>Vertical escalation</b>	Complements more formal safety management	Clear objectives with accountable handovers of responsibility
<b>Obligation to Act</b>	Involves and empowers operational staff	Improvement management translated into everyday operational activity

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## Implementation Trials

- 'Proof of concept' - overall validity of the concept
  - Does it actually work in practice in a normal operation?
  - Validation of the functionality and usability of software applications.
- Trials to include
  - Application integration into host IT and operational environment
  - Training, usability assessment and final adjustment / debugging
  - Implementation trials – 3 months
  - Validation and evaluation – usability, mindfulness metrics, operational KPIs

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## Exploitation potential



- Wide applicability
  - This includes all industries that carry a significant operational risk –e.g. aviation, and health and social care, emergency services, financial services and other transport modes.
- Importance of full trial implementation
  - To provide powerful evidence of the exploitation potential of FSS Safety Mindfulness model and outputs both in aviation and wider afield
- Build evidence base for implementation of mindfulness solutions
  - Scientific impact
  - Industrial impact

### Appendix B.9 “P5: Towards an airport-wide safety dashboard” – Carlo Valbonesi, Deep Blue



## Towards an airport-wide safety dashboard

Carlo VALBONESI (DBL) – 7<sup>th</sup> December 2017, Koln, DLR HQ



## Outline

- P5 context: safety intelligence
- Safety dashboard: what and why
- First step: safety dashboards for ANSP
- Looking forward to the airport Stack

## P5 context: safety intelligence




Figure taken from: EUROCONTROL, *Safety Intelligence for ATM CEOs - A White Paper*, May 2013

## Safety dashboard: what and why

“Dashboards [...] are **cognitive tools** that improve your **“span of control”** over a lot of business data.

These tools help people **visually identify trends, patterns and anomalies**, reason about what they see, help guide them toward **effective decisions**”\*. (R. Brath & M. Peters)

\*Richard Brath and Michael Peters, “Dashboard Design: Why Design is Important”, DM Direct, October 2004



## Safety dashboard: what and why




Figure taken from: EUROCONTROL, *Safety Intelligence for ATM CEOs - A White Paper*, May 2013

## First step: safety dashboards for ANSP



### Safety Dashboard User group:

- Safety Directors / Managers
- In-person interviews + workshop in Rome



### To understand state of play:



- Users
- Process of adoption
- Content
- Scenarios
- Platform
- Level of interactivity
- ...




## First step: safety dashboards for ANSP




- What should be the minimum set of indicators for an ideal ANSP SDB?





## First step: safety dashboards for ANSP

- A first version of the SDB was presented at the FSS Brussels public workshop in April 2017
- Meanwhile, interactions with SDB UG members continued in order to validate the dashboard prototype
- Next, the current version...



## First step: safety dashboards for ANSP

- So what?
- All this work recently found endorsement from **ECTL Safety team** (11-12 October meeting)
- Two meetings planned for Jan and March 2018 to further **refine and validate** the safety dashboard
- **Goal:** 4+ ANSPs start using the prototype SDB at Executive Board level, then feedback the lessons learnt to other ANSPs.

# Looking forward to the airport stack dashboard

## Looking forward to the airport Stack

- LTN Stack is a **joint effort for safety improvement** undertaken by organisations based in Luton airport
- Several action lines, from streamlining of procedures, adoption of standard, pooled training etc.
- The work on SDB has raised some interest in the Stack and it is now a strand of work



**easyJet**

**W!ZZ**

**MENZIES**  
AVIATION

...and others

## Looking forward to the airport Stack

### Section 1 & 3:

1. HPB - 'Holding Point Bravo'. A designated stopping point for
2. Incorrect push backs (push back wrong way & signals) - Yes

Needs to be agreed with the stack but examples are:

- Aircraft taxiing in wrong direction
- Refuelling procedure not followed (fire risk)
- Air traffic instruction incorrect - runway line up
- EMAs
- Fall from height

**NEED:** Graph should be selectable from drop down menu to show the three highest scoring risk events in each category.

great to colour code for handling partner / 3<sup>rd</sup> party

**NEED:** Would recommend that any single 'high scoring event' or multiple low scoring events be identified as hot topics if they occur within a specified time period.

1. Aircraft left unattended with cabin door
2. Aircraft left unattended with cabin door
3. Part of taxiway tarmac failed and became

### Section 4: Near Miss

1. Loading not done in accordance with L
2. Pushback Sheer Pin Failures
3. No aircraft marshaller on arrival (aircraft stuck on taxiway or on manoeuvre in taxiway or on arrival)

**Luton Stack Dashboard**  
 Last access: 16/9/2017

Hi John!

Select event: All types | Select timeframe: Last month | Confirm

#### A measure of near misses

Bar chart showing frequency of near miss types. Legend includes: Fall from height other types, Refuelling, Aircraft left unattended, Pushback Sheer Pin Failures, Loading not done in accordance with L, Aircraft stuck on taxiway or on manoeuvre in taxiway or on arrival, Aircraft taxiing in wrong direction, Refuelling procedure not followed (fire risk), Air traffic instruction incorrect - runway line up, EMAs, Fall from height.

#### Hotspot Map

Event overview map showing locations of incidents on the airport tarmac.

#### Recent Notable Events

- 29 Sep 2017: **Incorrect pushback** - Inbound A320 stopped short of stand. Push back air suffered headset failure. Near collision averted by ATC intervention.
- 29 Sep 17: **Contamination aircraft fuel** - During fueling of an Airbus Air A320 taxi-GABCC on stand 8, fuel vented from the starboard wing. Spillage size approx. 3 metres x 2 metres. Air Ops attended and treated spillage with three stages of solvent cleaning. Inter-stand road was removed from service for four days, and reopened at 1545. No fuel entered the drainage system. Engineers are investigating cause, report expected 02/10/17.
- 27 Sep 17: **Hold Point Bust** - Departing Airbus Air A320 GABCC crossed the stop bar of Oxley 1. There was a risk of collision with outbound aircraft, but the bust was observed by ATC who were able to safely intervene. Flight crew are returning to LTN on 01/10/2017 and will be met by the Operations Duty Manager to conduct an investigation. Further action to be shared.

#### Results from latest audit on Air Ops

Finding	Recommendation
Apron users unaware of parking restriction.	Air Ops to use Points of Engagement to communicate this restriction and safety principles relating to it.
Equipment bay was too large, leading to attempt to place two sets of steps in it.	Air Ops to remain alert to ensure correct parking.
Vehicle operator could not see passenger guidance personnel and had to brake abruptly.	Air Ops to use Points of Engagement to communicate correct passenger parking protocol and positioning.
Load released from vehicle although it was secured using equipment.	Review of equipment and securing techniques to be carried out by TCR and handling agents.

#### Change Management


Change	Timeframe	Risk	Impact on operations
Construction of new taxiway	Original opening January 2018	Removal of taxiway, closure to most introduction of new taxiway (Sustainability)	Potential confusion for aircraft and staff on the airfield.
Construction of new taxiway	Original opening January 2018	Live works on airfield	Taxiway Bravo unavailable during period 0200 to 0500 between 01/11/2017 and 15/11/2017.
Stand renumbering on East Apron	16/11/2017	Stands to be renumbered to allow for allocation of code D and C aircraft	Potential confusion for aircraft and staff on the airfield.
Stand renumbering on East Apron	16/11/2017	Stands to be removed from service and returned to its own schedule and weather on the day.	Stands will be removed from service and returned to its own schedule and weather on the day.

#### Looking forward

**Closure of stand 14**  
 Stand 14 will be closed between 17/10/2017 0900 and 19/10/2017 for essential drainage works. During the works, the stand will be bordered off and lit by red lights as there will be open trenches.

**Winter Operations**  
 Air Ops is currently looking for volunteers to train in snow clearing for winter 17-18. Training is scheduled to take place evenings 1900 to 1200 local. Please contact the ODM if you would like to get involved.

**Wildlife Hazard**  
 During October we typically see large numbers of migrating birds flying close to the airfield. It is essential that FOD, especially fuel waste, is removed from the airfield so that wildlife is not attracted. Remove all FOD and waste, and always contact the ODM to report it if you are unable.




## Results so far

### Achievements

- Interest from ECTL
- Interest from LTN Stack
  - Agreeing to share safety data – not trivial!
- Visual prototypes as a starting point

### Challenges

- Agreeing to share: which are the boundaries?
- Re-conciliation of user-centred approach with implementation constrains
- Collaboration process with the stack to be fine-tuned



**Appendix B.10** “P6: Human performance envelope” – Barry Kirwan, EUROCONTROL

European Commission

FUTURE SKY SAFETY

## P6 Human Performance Envelope

FUTURE SKY SAFETY – 2<sup>nd</sup> Consortium Workshop, 6-7 December 2017  
 Barry Kirwan, EUROCONTROL

## FSS P6: Human Performance Envelope



**Consortium**

DLR Lead  
15 Partners  
233 PM



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16 January, 2018 | 2

## Objectives



**Consortium**

DLR Lead  
15 Partners  
233 PM

- Definition of the Human Performance Envelope (HPE)
- Conduction of preliminary experiments
  - To select and assess sensors
- Conduction of first flight simulator experiments
  - To validate the HPE
  - To validate sensors
  - To identify performance decrement limits
- Development of new HMI to recover performance
- Conduction of second simulator experiments
  - To validate new HMI

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## Work Packages

### WP 6.2

Conduction of exploratory simulations

T7 - T18



## Concept Development

### WP 6.1


Concept development

D6.1 "Concept for Human Performance Envelope"

Definition of the HPE:


Agreement to focus on **Workload, Stress and Situation Awareness** as the main factors of the HPE in the simulator experiments

Concept workshop  
April 2015



## Work Packages

**WP 6.1**  
Concept development  
T0 - T12




The radar chart illustrates 'PILOT'S PERFORMANCE' across eight dimensions: ATTENTION, SA, VIGILANCE, TEAMWORK, NO WORKLOAD, COMMUNICATION, TRUST, and NO FATIGUE. A legend indicates three performance levels: OPTIMAL (white), CRITICAL (black), and DEGRADED (grey). The chart shows that 'ATTENTION' and 'SA' are in the CRITICAL state, while 'VIGILANCE' and 'TEAMWORK' are in the DEGRADED state. The remaining dimensions (NO STRESS, NO FATIGUE, TRUST, COMMUNICATION, and NO WORKLOAD) are in the OPTIMAL state.

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## Work Packages

**WP 6.3**  
Determination of recovery measures  
T7 - T18



The line graph shows 'Human Machine Performance' (dashed line) and 'Cognitive resources onboard' (solid line) over time. Both metrics show a downward trend. The 'Human Machine Performance' starts high and gradually declines. The 'Cognitive resources onboard' starts lower and declines more sharply, crossing below the 'Human Machine Performance' line towards the end of the period.

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## Work Packages

**WP 6.4**

Evaluation of solutions for augmenting the envelope

T19 – T39



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## Scenarios

**WP 6.1**


Concept development

D6.2 "Test plan for preliminary systems/pilots cognitive task analysis"

**Development of the simulator scenarios**

**Fine tuning of scenarios** with project members, pilots and Human Factors experts

Pilot workshop  
October 2015



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
16 January, 2018 | 9

## Scenarios

### WP 6.1

Concept development

D6.2 "Test plan for preliminary systems/pilots cognitive task analysis"



## Sensors

### WP 6.2

Conduction of exploratory simulations

D6.3 "Test report preliminary testing with systems/pilots cognitive task analysis"

**Selection and assessment of the sensors** for measuring the different factors

**Preliminary experiments** at ONERA and Cranfield University with NASA Multi-Attribute Task Battery



# First Simulator Experiments



## WP 6.2

Conduction of exploratory simulations

D6.3 "Test report preliminary testing with systems/pilots cognitive task analysis"

### Experiments in A320 DLR flight simulator AVES

- 10 Lufthansa crews
- 9 scenarios with varying workload, stress and situation awareness



# First Simulator Experiments



## WP 6.2

Conduction of exploratory simulations



D6.3 "Test report preliminary testing with systems/pilots cognitive task analysis"

### Subjective Measures:

- ISA, NASA-TLX, SACL, SART, Samn-Perelli

### Eye Tracking Data:

- Point of gaze, blink rate, areas of interest, pupil diameter



# First Simulator Experiments





## WP 6.2

Conduction of exploratory simulations

D6.3 "Test report preliminary testing with systems/pilots cognitive task analysis"

### Performance Data:

- Speed, heading, altitude, vertical speed, localiser and glideslope deviations, point of touchdown
- Crew competency evaluation
- Performance curves



# First Simulator Experiments





## WP 6.2

Conduction of exploratory simulations

D6.3 "Test report preliminary testing with systems/pilots cognitive task analysis"

### Physiological Data:

- Heart Rate (HR), HR variability, RR intervals, breath rate, perfusion index





## Development of New HMI




WP 6.3  
 WP 6.4

Determination of recovery measures

Evaluation of solutions for augmenting the envelope

### New HMI present information about:

- Limitations of the aircraft
- Operational consequences of the limitations
- Available options



## Development of New HMI



WP 6.3  
 WP 6.4

Determination of recovery measures

Evaluation of solutions for augmenting the envelope

- New HMI were integrated in Thales Avionics 2020 Cockpit Simulator



## Second Simulator Experiments



### WP 6.4

Evaluation of solutions for augmenting the envelope

Experiments in Avionics 2020 Cockpit Simulator at Thales in October this year

- Test runs on 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> October
- Experimental runs from 16<sup>th</sup> until 27<sup>th</sup> October
- 20 pilots from Lufthansa participated (first officers flying A320)



## Second Simulator Experiments



### WP 6.4

Evaluation of solutions for augmenting the envelope

- Same aircraft model as in first simulator experiments (A320)
- Same scenario as in first simulator experiments (approach into Bremen with technical failure in complex situation)
- Same captain as in first simulator experiments
- Same measurements as in first simulator experiments



## Second Simulator Experiments



**WP 6.4**

Evaluation of solutions for augmenting the envelope

D6.5 “Test plan large scale simulations with evaluation protocol”

D6.6 “Test report large scale simulations”

D6.7 “Recommendations for augmenting the human performance envelope”

- Complete results will be available March 2018



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**Appendix B.11** “P6: Can we exploit technology to measure the Human Performance Envelope?” – Jim Nixon, Cranfield University




## Can we exploit technology to measure the Human Performance Envelope?

Dr Jim Nixon



## The aircraft performance envelope



## Interface design (1980s style)





**We're much more sophisticated now...**



4



**And so are our aircraft...**




5



6



## The aircraft knows more than it lets on



7



## Currently the aircraft does not know about the state of the crew

- How could we measure the state of the crew?
- What could we infer from these measures?
- How reliable are these measures?
- How acceptable are these measures?



8



## How could we measure the state of the crew?

- Measures would need to be:
  - Continuous
  - Unobtrusive
  - Reliable
  - Acceptable to the crew and the operation



9




## Physiological measures



10



## Measuring electrical signals from the heart



11



## ECG Technology



∴ csem

12



## EEG



13



## Eyes



14




## Depth sensing cameras



15



## What could we infer from these measures?



16



## How reliable are these measures?

17




## Acceptable to the crew and the operation?

18



## Can we exploit technology to measure the Human Performance Envelope?



19

## Appendix B.12 “P6: Simulator Research and development of new cockpit interfaces. Do pilots get the information they need?” – Cpt. Carsten Schmidt-Moll, Lufthansa




### P6: Simulator Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Do pilots get the information they need?

Cpt. Carsten Schmidt-Moll, Lufthansa





### Increase of Workload due to a change of industry

- Larger Aircraft into smaller airports
- Reliability of the schedule (independent of weather and time of day)
- Airlines operating with less Extra Fuel

 **Lufthansa** Change of industry 

- Larger Aircraft into smaller airports
- Reliability of the schedule (independent of weather and time of day)
- Airlines operating with less Extra Fuel



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 5

 **Lufthansa** Approach- and Abnormal Procedure 

➤ Normal Approach

- approach briefing
- landing performance calculation (on EFB\*)

➤ Abnormal Procedure

- Abnormal procedure (ECAM of aircraft)
- OM-B (additional documentation on EFB\*)
- NEW landing perf. calculation (on EFB\*)
- NEW approach briefing
  
- Check of quick reference handbook

\* EFB = Electronic Flight Bag, Tablet or Notebook used by the pilot

P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 6

 **Lufthansa** Approach- and **Abnormal** Procedure 

➤ **Normal Approach**

- approach briefing
- landing performance calculation (on EFB\*)



➤ **Abnormal Procedure**

- **Abnormal procedure** (ECAM for aircraft)
- **OM-B** (additional documentation on EFB\*)
- **NEW landing performance calculation** (on EFB\*)
- **NEW approach briefing**
- **Check of quick reference handbook**

Pilot Flying (+ATC)


Pilot Monitoring

\* EFB = Electronic Flight Bag, Tablet or Notebook used by the pilot


 **Lufthansa** „Easy“ Scenario 

- + No interruptions
- + No other ATC conversation
- + No distraction by the cabin crew
- + No turbulence
- + No distracting noise
- + Fuel for 60 min
  
- No decision making by the Captain (Pilot Flying)







\* New Weather AITS K: EDDW 16018KT RVR 0500 BKN002 OVC004, Temp 1/0 1013 RWY 4mm slush -SN



\* BRE RWY 09 in use due to wind; shorter distance than to divert to Hamburg or Hannover!






➤ **Normal Approach**

- approach briefing
- landing performance calculation (on EFB\*)
  
- **NEW approach briefing**

➤ **Abnormal Procedure**

- abnormal procedure (ECAM of aircraft)
- OM-B (additional documentation on EFB\*)
- **NEW landing perf. calculation (on EFB\*)**
  
- **Check of quick reference handbook**



\* EFB = Electronic Flight Bag, Tablet or Notebook used by the pilot

1. Insufficient low fuel warning and wrong format



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development

 **Lufthansa** New Cockpit Interfaces: Fuel indication 



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

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 **Lufthansa** 



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

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 **Fuel indication: right place - right format** 



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 23

 **Time needed for a hike** 



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 24



1. Insufficient low fuel warning and wrong format
2. Manufacturer does not recommend to skip a procedure (OM-B: Premature termination/ disregarding abnormal procedures: „... In any case, the basic procedures must be followed. ...“)

 **New Cockpit Interfaces** 

1. Insufficient low fuel warning and wrong format
2. Manufacturer does not recommend to skip a procedure (OM-B: Premature termination/ disregarding abnormal procedures: „... In any case, the basic procedures must be followed...“)

© Lufthansa 01 OCT 2015 ABN 103

EMERGENCY EVACUATION	
AIRCRAFT/PARKING BRK. ....	STOP/ON
ATC (VHF 1).....	NOTIFY
CABIN CREW (PA).....	ALERT
ΔP (only if MAN CAB PR has been used).....	CHECK ZERO
If not zero, MODE selector on MAN, V/S CTL FULL UP.	
ENG MASTER (ALL).....	OFF
FIRE Pushbuttons (ALL: ENG and APU).....	PUSH
AGENTS (ENG and APU).....	AS RQRD
■ If Evacuation required:	
EVACUATION.....	INITIATE
■ If Evacuation not required:	
CABIN CREW and PASSENGERS (PA).....	NOTIFY

P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces


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 **New HMI for „out of the box“-scenarios** 



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 28



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 29




1. Insufficient low fuel warning and wrong format
2. Manufacturer does not recommend to skip a procedure (OM-B: Premature termination/ disregarding abnormal procedures: „... In any case, the basic procedures must be followed. ...“)
3. Pilots do not get the important and relevant information

P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

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Car Navigation:  
„You have not reached your destination.  
Please turn around when possible“




P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 31

 **New Cockpit Interfaces** 

1. Insufficient low fuel warning and wrong format
2. Manufacturer does not recommend to skip a procedure (OM-B: Premature termination/ disregarding abnormal procedures: „... In any case, the basic procedures must be followed. ...“)
3. Pilots do not get the important and relevant information



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 32

1. Insufficient low fuel warning and wrong format
2. Manufacturer does not recommend to skip a procedure (OM-B: Premature termination/ disregarding abnormal procedures: „... In any case, the basic procedures must be followed. ...“)
3. Pilots do not get the important and relevant information
4. The Pilots „Electronic Flight Bag“ (EFB) is crucial for flight safety


- library: over 30 (!) different operational manuals
- company news, duty roster, safety bulletin
- performance calculation tool
- electronic communication (email, all reports)
- route manual with maps and charts
- complete briefing tool (weather, NOTAMS, etc.)
- over 70 (!) computer based training programs
- different tools (dictionary, converter, etc.)
- flight and fuel efficiency program
- etc. etc. etc.




- library: over 30(!) different operational manuals
- company news, duty roster, safety bulletin
- performance calculation tool
- electronic communication (email, all reports)
- route manual with maps and charts
- complete briefing tool (weather, NOTAMS, etc.)
- over 70 (!) computer based training programs
- different tools (dictionary, converter, etc.)
- flight and fuel efficiency program
- etc. etc. etc.



Updates...





P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 37



P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

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- Demographic
- Physiological
  - Heart Rate variability
  - Hear Rate
  - ECG Waves (R-R interval)
  - Breath Rate
  - Perfusion Index
  - Pulse strength
  - etc.
- Behavioural
  - HPE Curves
  - Behavioural Markers
  - etc.

### Physiological data does NOT refer to the risk



➤ **Simulator research did show: Cockpit interfaces must improve in various areas**

1. Information must not be spread across different documents (e.g. ECAM, OM-B)

- **Simulator research did show: Cockpit interfaces must improve in various areas**
  1. Information must not be spread across different documents (e.g. ECAM, OM-B)
  2. Warnings and cautions must correspond to the severity of the risk

- **Simulator research did show: Cockpit interfaces must improve in various areas**
  1. Information must not be spread across different documents (e.g. ECAM, OM-B)
  2. Warnings and cautions must correspond to the severity of the risk
  3. Relevant information must be in a usable format (remaining fuel in minutes)

- **Simulator research did show: Cockpit interfaces must improve in various areas**
  1. Information must not be spread across different documents (e.g. ECAM, OM-B)
  2. Warnings and cautions must correspond to the severity of the risk
  3. Relevant information must be in a usable format (remaining fuel in minutes)
  4. Relevant ext. data must be made available for decision making (e.g. weather)


- **Simulator research did show: Cockpit interfaces must improve in various areas**
  1. Information must not be spread across different documents (e.g. ECAM, OM-B)
  2. Warnings and cautions must correspond to the severity of the risk
  3. Relevant information must be in a usable format (remaining fuel in minutes)
  4. Relevant ext. data must be made available for decision making (e.g. weather)
  5. Physiological data does not help us

➤ **Simulator research did show: Cockpit interfaces must improve in various areas**

1. Information must not be spread across different documents (e.g. ECAM, OM-B)
2. Warnings and cautions must correspond to the severity of the risk
3. Relevant information must be in a usable format (remaining fuel in minutes)
4. Relevant ext. data must be made available for decision making (e.g. weather)
5. Physiological data does not help us
6. Pilots electronic flight bag must also be considered relevant for flight safety

P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 45



**The team - Thank you all!**  
**Thank you for your attention**

P6: Human Performance Envelope: Research and development of new cockpit interfaces

Cologne, 07.12.2017 - 46

## Appendix B.13 “P7: Mitigating risks of fire, smoke and fumes” – Eric Deletombe, ONERA



The slide features the European Commission logo in the top left and the Future Sky Safety logo in the top right. The main title is "FSS Workshop 2 – 07/12/2017" and the subtitle is "P7 Mitigating Risks of FS&F". Below the title, contact information for Eric Deletombe at ONERA is provided. A central image shows a commercial airplane from a top-down perspective. Surrounding the airplane are logos for partner organizations: Embraer, Airbus, Alenia Aermacchi, NLR, DLR, ONERA, Cranfield University, and CEIIA.

**Content**

- Introduction
- Short Overview of P7 Project
- Overall Technical Progress & Results
- Dissemination & Exploitation
- Conclusions

**PROJECT #7**  
**MITIGATING THE RISK OF FIRE, SMOKE & FUMES**

**TYPE OF PROJECT**  
Collaborative project

**PROJECT MANAGER**  
ONERA

**THEME**  
Building ultra-resilient vehicles

**SAFETY | FUTURE SKY** 12 December, 2017 | 2/22

## Introduction

**Almost 50% fatalities in case of accidents are fire caused/related.** About 300 fatalities/year could be saved if fire fatalities were suppressed.

**Emerging** - New trends / new risks :

- **More electric aircraft** maybe increases risks of in-flight fires,
- **More organic composites** in A/C design with very different behavior compared to metallic materials,
- **Limited knowledge** wrt fire & heat behavior of **composites materials**.

CMO composites claimed to bring better burnthrough protection !

**What about mechanical stiffness/strength under compression** above 200°C (glassy transition) for structural integrity during evacuation ?

**What about heat, toxic fumes and smoke ?**

Few EU research on Composite Aircraft fire related safety : see Aircraft Fire Project.

Few test results available (plus industry tests are often confidential), expensive.

## Short Overview of the P7 Project (1/2)

**To increase safety by ...**


O1 : **Improving knowledge** concerning OMC materials and structures behaviours vs fire

O2 : **Assessing mechanical properties** of heating/burning/degraded materials

O3 : **Evaluating the fire consequences** (incl. toxicity, smoke), proposing solutions to mitigate them

O4 : **Sharing database** for future modelling purposes (expensive tests)

O5 : **Establishing/giving design recommendations**



## WP7.1: Understanding and characterising the fire behaviour of primary structure composite materials (epoxy resins, standard CFRP)

*ONERA, CRANFIELD, CEIIA, AIRBUS D&S, EMBRAER.*



- **Enhance knowledge** concerning the fire behaviour and performance of **CFRP primary structure materials**
- **Produce** a comprehensive experimental **database on a reference material (T700GC/M21)**
- **Share the results** within the European research community
- **Confront experimental results to state-of-the-art models** and simulation tools

*See also specific presentation ...*

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## WP7.1 Physico-chemical properties of T700/M21 after fire exposure

- For instance : monitor the physico-chemical state of degraded material
- At material level (T7.1.2)...
- Objectives : be able to study the residual properties of well controlled degraded material
  - definition of an experimental protocol to prepare charred sample materials from thermogravimetric analysis and Arrhenius kinetics
- Choice of a slow isothermal decomposition in a furnace for homogeneous decomposition within the material (Yellow curve)





Also for material modelling purposes ...

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## WP7.1 Mechanical properties of T700/M21 after fire exposure

- Preparation of charred material specimens
  - Composite plate degradation in a furnace
- Study residual mechanical properties of degraded material
  - Design of a specific grip system
- Results : important decrease of the mechanical properties and no more rate effect!
- Also for material modelling purposes ...



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## WP7.1 Residual fire or mechanical properties of T700/M21 panels




- **Post impact fire testing**

- at structural level (T7.1.3) ...
- Propose methodology for the analysis of combined mechanical and fire loading during the life cycle of the composite structure
- Fire response of pre-impacted panels or impact resistance of pre-degraded/ burnt panels


- **Test results reporting in progress**

- **Also for structural modelling purposes ...**



Post-impact damage analysis

Tire debris impact on composite panel



Fire test

## WP7.2 : Improving material solutions to mitigate fire, smoke and fumes in cabin environment (plus toxicity)



**DLR, VZLU, ALENIA, CAA**

- Enhance passengers safety through the **development and assessment of new material solutions** that mitigate risks of fire, smoke and fumes in the cabin environment
- **Assess new solutions** at material and structural levels **wrt current industrial safety requirements** using standard experimental methods and state-of-the art simulation tools
- Study novel highly fire resistant materials **addressing the main mechanisms that improve the fire resistance at material level**



*See also P7 exploitation measure & VZLU poster ...*

## WP7.2 Requirements & Models (LEONARDO)

### Requirements & specifications (T7.2.1)

- Definition of test & specimens, in terms of certification rules and relative test in compliance with them, defined on the basis of industrial state of art, and applicability. Support to test specimen set up.
- Definition of material characteristics that must be measured during the test for the numerical correlation of models.
- Almost all the tests have been performed by partners,
- Now in Progress :
  - Gathering material characteristic data and flame penetration test results
  - Evaluation material models and simulation tools (flame penetration), with respect to standard and new cabin material solutions
  - Evaluation of industrial applicability of materials defined in the project, in order to define/reformulate new standard aeronautical fire tests.

### Plan of experiments

Test	Test method	Parameter
Flame Propagation / Flammability	ASTM E 662 (Vertical, 60 sec)	Fire properties
Flame Penetration Resistance	CS 25 Appendix 7, part II)	Fire properties
Heat Release Rate	ASTM E 1358	Fire properties
Smoke Density	ASTM E 662	Fire properties
Smoke Toxicity	ASTM E 1358	Fire properties
Back surface temperature profile	ULB test method	Fire properties
Mechanical properties after fire exposure	ULB test method	Fire properties
Tensile	ISO 527	Mechanical properties
	ASTM D 792	
Compression	ISO 178	Mechanical properties
	ASTM D 662	
Torsion (TBB)	ISO 178	Mechanical properties
Lap shear	ISO EN 8008	Mechanical properties
Impact (IAB)	ASTM D 2000	Mechanical properties
	ASTM D 792	
Shear	ISO EN 8008	Mechanical properties
DMA	ISO 6708, Part 1	Mechanical/Thermal properties
TMA	ISO 1570	Mechanical/Thermal properties
DTG	ISO 11357 method	Thermal properties
TGA	ISO 11357 method	Thermal properties
Density	Hydrostatic weighing	Material traits

### Test specimen – set up




### Material characteristic

Density  
 Production coefficient  
 Simulate weathering results  
 Absorption energy  
 Thermal expansion coefficient  
 Polymer matrix (assumed to be constant over Temp)  
 Young's Modulus in fibre direction @ RT, T<sub>a</sub>, T<sub>b</sub>  
 Young's Modulus in transverse fibre direction @ RT, T<sub>a</sub>, T<sub>b</sub>  
 Shear Modulus @ RT, T<sub>a</sub>, T<sub>b</sub>  
 Glass  
 Compression Strength @ RT, T<sub>a</sub>, T<sub>b</sub>  
 max loss



### Certification and qualification Test resu

Test duration time  
 Temperature at thermocouple  
 Temperature pattern measured with thermocams  
 Visual inspection of specimen after the test



## WP7.2 Geopolymers (VZLU)

- Study new material solutions (T7.2.2)
- Geopolymer materials (see VZLU Poster)
- FS&F Tests :
  - Smoke Optical Density tests and Fire Effluents tests of Carbon fiber / Geopolymer Composite (compared with referential Glass fiber / Phenol Composite)
  - Fire Penetration Tests of Carbon fiber / Geopolymer Sandwich Structures (foam and honeycomb cores)
- Mechanical Tests (accd previous WS comments) :
  - Impact Tests of Carbon fiber / Geopolymer Sandwich Structures (incl. hot/wet exposed specimens)
  - Drum Peel Tests of Carbon fiber / Geopolymer Sandwich Structures (foam and honeycomb cores)
  - Geopolymer foam – processing and compression tests




VID Visible Impact Damage  
 BVID Barely Visible Impact Damage  
 Hy Geopolymer/phenol hybrid  
 EXP 2 weeks hot/wet exposed  
 Impact Test Results (ASTM D 7136/D 7136M - 07)



## WP7.2 FMLs, HER & GPLs (DLR)

- **Study new material solutions (T7.2.2)**
- Material characterisation of unidirectional CFRP and quasi-isotropic FML:
  - Finished for DMA (see graph), **Tension, Shear tests**,
  - **Compression tests currently in progress**,
- Construction of a test stand for testing Compression properties under simultaneous fire exposure (CuFEx).
  - **Tests under progress** for FML, GPL (delivered by VZLU) and CFRP.
- **Combination of natural fibres (flax) and recycled carbon fibres with Geopolymer Matrix (GPL) (accd previous WS comments)**
  - Composites manufactured at VZLU
  - Specimens prepared at DLR ESTH Tests and static flexural tests under fire



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DLR ESTH Tests and static flexural tests under fire  
 Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic  
 Fiber Metal laminate  
 GeoPolymers  
 Hybrid Ecological Reinforcements  
 Flammability Smoke Toxicity  
 Heat Release

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## WP7.3 : effects of new materials, technology and fuel systems on the on-board air quality NLR, CEIIA, CRANFIELD, EMBRAER, CAA

- Investigate **opportunities** offered by technical developments to **study air quality**
- **Focus on safety considerations**
- Thorough **understanding of sources** and recent developments as basis for integrated solutions
- **Sensing technology investigation**
- **Industrial framework** for monitoring of air quality

*See also specific presentation ...*




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## WP7.3 Stringent issues wrt CAQ

### Several reported issues / emerging questions concerning :

- **Impact of new materials:**
  - aging and accelerated degradation
  - interactions
  - e.g. nanomaterials (REACH; general)
- **New materials (composites) in conditions of elevated temperatures**
  - fire -> WPs 7.1,7.2
- **Cabin fumes**
  - **health concerns** gained public and authority attention (UK, Germany, The Netherlands, ... (globally))
  - **many studies appeared** incl. 2 studies from EASA (2017)



Cabin Air Quality  
 A/C Commercial Aircraft


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## WP7.3 Literature study (T7.3.1 & T7.3.2)

### Literature survey covering :

- **Working definition CAQ:**
  - cabin air quality is the holistic (physical, chemical, biological, radiological) characteristics of cabin air.
- **Management cabin air (ECS):**
  - bleed air or electrically compressed air (B787)
- **Potential contaminants and sources**
- **Methods of monitoring air quality**
  - reporting (incidents, in-flight investigations)
  - biomonitoring crew
- **Current standards:**
  - A/C: All-purpose requirements, functional tests (e.g. ECS)
  - A/C: Design rules
  - test standards
- **Other enclosed environments** (e.g., ISS, submarines)
  - substances with known issues are monitored in real-time



COSAMS (carbon monoxide submarine atmosphere monitoring system) from Analox

Environmental Control System (onboard air conditioning system)  
 International Space Station

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## WP7.3 New concepts of sensors (T7.3.3)

Candidate sensors to study and/or monitoring CAQ :

- **Suggested ideal criteria:**
  - small, light, easy to use, inexpensive, sensitive
- **Real-time commercial sensors:**
  - cabin environment is challenging: On-board conditions. a/c safetv. ....
  - low cost is coming up rapidly
- **Delayed analysis commercial sensors:**
  - correct sampling strategy required
- **Research sensors**
  - smaller, wider range, etc
  - specificity and repeatability continues to be challenge
  - MEMS, e-noses, ..



R. Z. C. Spioer et. al, *Relate Air Quality ...report (2004)*



Miniature sampling canister



Personal ozone monitor


In relation with industrial framework for cabin air quality (D7.11)

- see specific presentation ...

Micro ElectroMechanical Systems

## WP7.3 Test Bench Concept (T7.3.3)

- **Possible WP7.3 product**
- Propose an Air quality test procedure for composite materials (based on AFNOR standard)
- Feasibility of monitoring system with low cost sensors ?




GC-MS analysis – To identify volatiles esp. epoxy resin derived e.g. phenols


SEM analysis – Analyse the char for particle sizing, potential for CNT's  
 COTS analysis – Comparison with GC-MS results as part of feasibility test

## WP7.3 Test Set-UP (T7.3.3)

- New test set-up developed in FSS,
- Use of commercial gas sensors,
- LABVIEW dashboard (monitoring results)



PID sensor (photoionisation detection gas sensor): VOCs with IE < 10.6 eV are detected. The resulting voltage is proportional to the gas concentration (ppm).



## FSS P7 – Dissemination & Events

- Presentations in 5 Conferences : EU, USA
  - Organisation of 1 mini-symposium
  - FSS Internal & Public Workshops
  - OPTICS dissemination event
- } > 1000 people


Robin Hron, František Martaus, Martin Kadlec, Roman Růžek, Geopolymer Laminate Peel Resistance of Adhesive Bonds with Foam and Honeycomb Cores, 17th International Multidisciplinary Scientific GeoConference (SGEM 2017), 27-30 November, 2017, Vienna.

Robin Hron, František Martaus, Martin Kadlec, Mechanical Properties of Fibre Reinforced Geopolymer Composites Exposed to Operating Fluids, 2nd International Conference on Innovative and Smart Materials (ICISM 2017), December 11-13, 2017, Paris.

+ Several papers to be submitted for publication in 2018 ...

## FSS P7 – Exploitation Measures (WP7.2)


Title	Structural prototype with new material solutions
Project P7	Mitigating Risk of Fire Smoke and Fumes
Objective(s)	Evaluate TRL and maturity level, confirm cost-benefit elements, identify transfer difficulties to industry Preparation of workshop/seminar to present/discuss new material solutions.



**Demonstrator to show the technologies developed and tested in WP7.2.** It will be made of two curved panels that are attached to each other by connectors. This represents the inner (interior) and outer (fuselage) shell of an airplane.

The key aspect of the FML (Fibre Metal Laminate) demonstrator is to show the different layers CF-Prepreg and metal by cut-outs in one corner of the demonstrator (see drawing below). The interior part will be made of geopolymer and natural fibres. Additional use of recycled carbon fibres is possible depending on the results of the project. The drawing shows a sandwich panel with honeycomb core. More likely is a monolithic panel as used today in the cargo compartment.

## FSS P7 2015 Conclusions & Next steps



ID	Title	GA Date	New Approved Date (FMC/PSG)
D7.7 [F]	Fire behaviour of primary structure materials (second batch test results)	T24	T36
D7.8 [G]	Materials for cabin environment protection – Test results (second batch)	T27	T36
D7.9 [H]	Primary structures material – Models for fire behaviour	T30	T36
D7.10 [I]	Materials for cabin environment protection – Models for material degradation	T30	T36 (T37 ?)
D7.11 [J]	Industrial framework proposal	T30	T34
D7.12 [K]	Primary structure materials - characterisation and modelling of materials fire behaviour	T33	T39
D7.13 [L]	Materials cabin environment protection - characterisation/modelling materials degradation	T33	T39
D7.14 [M]	On-board air quality – Effects of new materials	T33	T39
D7.15 [N]	Final synthesis report	T36	T42

6 months delay

WP7.1	101	90%
WP7.2	111	90%
WP7.3	72	80%
<b>Total</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>88%</b>

## Acknowledgments to P7 team




Thank you for your attention !  
Any Questions ?

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**Appendix B.14** “P7: Characterisation of the thermo-mechanical behaviour of CFRP (T700GC/M21) under high temperature conditions” – Eric Deletombe, ONERA



European Commission



Characterisation of the thermo-mechanical behaviour of CFRP (T700GC/M21) under high temperature conditions

**WP7.1 “Understanding and characterising the fire behaviour of primary structure composite materials”**

Thomas Batmalle (ONERA/DMPE)  
Julien Berthe (ONERA/DMAS)  
Valentin Biasi (ONERA/DMPE)  
Alain Deudon (ONERA/DMAS)  
Cédric Huchette (ONERA/DMAS)  
Gillian Leplat (ONERA/DMPE)  
Gérald Portemont (ONERA/DMAS)  
Jean-Michel Roche (ONERA/DMAS)



ONERA  
THE FRENCH AEROSPACE LAB

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March, 9<sup>th</sup> 2017

## Outlines




- Aviation safety regulation
- Fire behaviour of composite materials
- Future Sky Safety: Project 7 Objectives
- Work Package 7.1 Approach
- Classical & New Test Protocols
- Test Results
- Conclusions

## Aviation safety regulation

Burnthrough resistance of aircraft structures



- Burnthrough test: fire behaviour of composite materials



Unlike some metallic structures, composite structures generally do not experience burnthrough after 4 or 5 minutes of fire exposure ... **BUT** ...

Understand complex physical phenomena



Get better safety margin management



Anticipate next fundamental issues


## Composite ply properties

Influence of the temperature increase



- **Carbon/epoxy composite material**

- Temperature dependency is due to the epoxy resin and may affect in plane loadings:
  - Compressive properties
  - Shear properties




## Fire behaviour of composite materials

Fundamental issues



- **Multiphysical problem with coupled phenomena**



\* Review of fire structural modelling of polymer composites  
A.P. Mouritz et al. Composites: Part A 40 (2009) 1800-1814

# Future Sky Safety: Project 7 objectives

Mitigate the risk of fire, smoke and fumes



## Work Package 7.1:

- Understanding and characterising the fire behaviour
- of primary structure composite materials

Enhance knowledge concerning the fire behaviour and performance of CFRP primary structure materials

Produce a comprehensive experimental database on a reference composite material (T700GC/M21)


Share the results within the European research community

Confront experimental results to state-of-the-art models and simulation tools



# Work Package 7.1 Approach

Understanding and characterizing the fire behaviour of primary structure composite materials thanks to classical (standard) and new test protocols



## Classical Test Protocols (DMA, TGA, DSC)

Influence of the temperature on the composite material **theromechanical and thermochemical** response

- Thermo-mechanical properties (Modulus), thermo chemical kinetics and energetics accd to temperature: available at ONERA




DMA+500 testing device from Metravib



METTLER TOLEDO TGA/DSC3+


TGA + DSC : easy correlation between the mass loss rate and the heat of reaction. Possibility to divide elementary chemical reactions occurring close to each other as the temperature increases. Valuable input data for: (1) *chemical decomposition mechanism: number of reactions? reactants and products? onset temperatures?* (2) *Arrhenius reaction rate equations for pyrolysis model,* (3) *Chemical source term in the energy equation for*



## Classical Test Protocols

Influence of the temperature on the composite material **tensile** properties in all directions

- Influence of high temperatures on the quasi-static tensile properties of composites: available at ONERA
- Study of the influence of the temperature on the static ply behaviour
  - Test performed in a Climate Chamber + DIC
  - Elastic behavior in fibre direction
  - Viscous behavior for shear and transverse loading



## Classical Test Protocols

High velocity impact response of composite panels



- Impact loading with a gas gun on a composite panel : available at ONERA, to perform fire test on impacted panels (or inverse way)

- Gas gun :
  - $\phi$  50mm,
  - up to  $v=250$  m/s (40 g)
- Two points bending rigs
- Optical barrier: projectile velocity
- HSC: Kinematics of the projectile during the test
- DIC: deformation of the panel skin.
- Strain gauges glued on the composite panel



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
March, 9<sup>th</sup> 2017 | 10

## New Test Protocols

Pyrolysis of composite materials



- Laser based heating system for pyrolysis : available at ONERA (presented at previous WSs)



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
March, 9<sup>th</sup> 2017 | 11

## New Test Protocols

Influence of the temperature on composite compressive properties esp. in the fiber direction



- High temperature compressive tests on UD ply : **developped in FSS P7**
  - A specific compressive testing set-up for high temperature compressive tests on UD ply has been developed to ensure correct loading conditions (very difficult in fact)




## New Test Protocols

Influence of temperature and strain rate on tensile properties in the shear direction



- High temperature tensile shear tests : **developped in FSS P7**
  - A specific testing set-up for high temperature tensile shear tests has been developed

Instron furnace:  
Tests between  
room  
temperature and  
170°C



Schenck servo-hydraulic  
jack:  
Speeds from 5mm/min  
up to 10 m/s


Optical extensometer for  
strain measurements

## New Test Protocols

Influence of the temperature and the strain rate on the tensile properties in the shear direction



- High temperature tensile shear tests: **developed in FSS P7**
- A specific testing set-up for high temperature tensile shear tests has been developed




## New Test Protocols

Influence of temperature on the tensile properties of composite materials in the fiber direction



- **INJECT** : Internal Joule heating for thErmo meChanical characTerisation : **available at ONERA**, for the study of high heating ramp, using digital cameras (visible or IR)



### INJECT


- Heating by Joule effect
- High heating ramp
- Multi instrumentation
- Standard coupon size
- Instantaneous mechanical behaviour



## New Test Protocols



- Influence of the high temperature (by Joule effect) on toughness properties : available at ONERA. For fracture toughness analysis under high temperature conditions



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## New Test Protocols



Flame-wall Interaction Research Experiment (FIRE)

- Study Fire/Flame effects on panels: available at ONERA.



Thermal response during fire-induced decomposition

### FEATURES




- Test coupon size: 350 x 350mm
- Premixed air-propane burner  $\varnothing$ 40mm
- Exposure time controlled by moving the burner on a sliding rail
- Transient temperature maps measured on the back surface using IR thermography
- Deformation measured by DIC using 2 cameras in a stereoscopic configuration associated to high power LED projector of a 50% random pattern
- Mass loss assessed with a high precision weighing module (full scale 410 g,  $\Delta m = 0.1$  mg)
- Flame front visualisation using hydroxyl (OH) radicals emission in the UV spectrum
- Characterisation of the flame dynamics using Laser Doppler Velocimetry (LDV) and Particle Image Velocimetry (PIV)

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## New Test Protocols

Flame-wall Interaction Research Experiment (FIRE)



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
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## Outlines

- Aviation safety regulation
- Fire behaviour of composite materials
- Future Sky Safety: Project 7 Objectives
- Work Package 7.1 Approach
- Classical & New Test Protocols
- **Test Results (thermal & thermo-chemical properties of Composite Materials)**
- Conclusions

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## Methodology of investigation

Independent experiments to isolate a single (set of) parameter(s)

- Numerous input parameters required for physico-chemical and thermo-mechanical models (here for T700/M21)

Parameter	Method	Reaction	Species	Temperature	Decomposition state	Fibres orientation
Arrhenius coefficients	TGA	✓				
Heat of reaction	DSC	✓				
Stoichiometric coefficients	TGA	✓				
Permeability tensor	X-ray μtomography				✓	✓
Gas properties	Gas chromatography Mass spectrometry	✓	✓	✓		
Density	Hydrostatic balance	✓			✓	
Mass fractions, volume fractions, partial densities	Homogenisation X-ray μtomography		✓		✓	
Specific heat	DSC / BLADE <sup>ONERA</sup>		✓	✓	✓	
Thermal conductivity tensor	LFM / BLADE <sup>ONERA</sup>		✓	✓	✓	✓

*Method of identification and variable dependency of each input parameter*

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
# Thermo-chemical kinetics and energetics




Mass loss rate, Arrhenius coefficients, reaction enthalpies



- Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC)
  - Exothermal pyrolysis measured with very low reaction enthalpy (& low accuracy)
  - Good agreement whatever the heating rate for the oxidations enthalpy
  - Confirmation of the oxidation sub-reactions on the heat flux signal



Pyrolysis enthalpy integration from DSC measurements



Oxidation enthalpy integration from DSC measurements

# Thermo-chemical kinetics and energetics




Mass loss rate, Arrhenius coefficients, reaction enthalpies




- Thermo Gravimetric Analysis (TGA) at different heating rates (BLADE)
  - 2 repeatability measurements for each heating rate
  - 3 different heating rate from 2 K/min up to 10 K/min
  - Air atmosphere : *pyrolysis AND oxidation reactions can occur*

Global decomposition mechanism  
 Resin pyrolysis:  $resin \rightarrow v char + (1 - v) gas_{pyro}$   
 Char oxidation:  $char + O_2 \rightarrow Gas_{oxi}$   
 Fibres oxidation:  $fibres + O_2 \rightarrow Gas_{oxi}$



Normalised mass loss as a function of temperature




Normalised mass loss rate as a function of temperature

## Thermo-chemical kinetics and energetics


Mass loss rate, Arrhenius coefficients, reaction enthalpies



- **Global kinetics model developed using Arrhenius reaction rate equations**
  - 3-stage-model used to fit the 3 global reactions
  - Good agreement whatever the heating rate
  - 3-stage-model could be improved
    - *pre-oxidation before 1<sup>st</sup> pyrolysis reaction*
    - *char and fibre oxidation may be composed of 2 sub-reactions*
- **Good correlation is obtained between model and test results**
- **Model used to prepare charred specimens**





Normalised mass loss as a function of temperature



Normalised mass loss rate as a function of temperature

## Outlines

- Aviation safety regulation
- Fire behaviour of composite materials
- Future Sky Safety: Project 7 Objectives
- Work Package 7.1 Approach
- Classical & New Test Protocols
- **Test Results (Mechanical Properties of Virgin Materials)**
- Conclusions




# Composite ply properties

Influence of the temperature on the tensile properties in the transverse direction


- High temperature on static tensile test and transverse loading
  - High influence of the viscous behavior for transverse loading



DMA vs Climate Chamber on  $[90]_g$



Thermal degradation (TGA)




# Composite ply properties

Influence of the temperature on the composite material tensile mechanical properties in all directions



- Influence on the quasi-static tensile test properties in transverse and shear direction



Tensile test on  $[0]_g$  = Fibre direction



Tensile test on  $[90]_g$  = Transverse dir.




Tensile test on  $[±45]_{4s}$  = Shear loading

## Composite ply properties

Influence of the temperature increase on the compressive properties in all the directions



- High temperature compressive tests on UD plies
- Huge variation of the mechanical properties with the temperature increase



T°	E <sub>22</sub>	σ <sub>max</sub>
20°C	8910 MPa ±2%	218 Mpa ±1.5%
120°C	8260MPa ±6%	151 Mpa ±3.2%
180°C	7170 MPa ±2%	122 Mpa ±6%
240°C	4470 MPa ±4%	65 Mpa ±5%

## Composite ply properties


Influence of the temperature and the strain rate on the tensile properties in the shear direction




- High temperature tensile shear tests
- Influence of strain rate and temperature on the shear behaviour



Influence of strain rate at room temperature




Influence of temperature at fixed loading rate



## Composite ply properties

Influence of the temperature and the strain rate on the tensile properties in the shear direction

- High temperature tensile shear tests
- Evolution of the shear modulus wrt the strain rate and the temperature



## Outlines

- Aviation safety regulation
- Fire behaviour of composite materials
- Future Sky Safety: Project 7 Objectives
- Work Package 7.1 Approach
- Classical & New Test Protocols
- Test Results (Mechanical Properties of Charred Materials & Panels)
- Conclusions

## Protocol to prepare charred sample materials

The methodology

BLADE facility  
Thermal properties  
Pyrolysis behaviour

METTLER TOLEDO TGA/DSC3+  
Chemical properties

Heat  
Fire  
Impact

Produce a comprehensive experimental database on a reference material (T700GC/M21)

FHS facility  
Fire behaviour

DMA testing device  
Mechanical and Thermo-mechanical behaviour

Numerical simulation tools

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## Residual mechanical properties after degradation

A multi-physics characterisation approach

- T700/M21 carbon/epoxy composite material
- Residual mechanical properties of degraded material
- An experimental protocol was required to prepare charred sample materials

Carbone Fibres

Epoxy resin

Heat


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
## Protocol to prepare charred sample materials

Combination of the thermal & thermo-chemical test results

- Definition of experimental protocol to prepare charred sample materials
  - Hypothesis: *slow isothermal decomposition in a furnace for homogeneous decomposition*



Isothermal mass loss computed from Arrhenius kinetics



Species mass fractions time evolution for  $T = 623\text{ K} = 350\text{ °C}$



Composite plate degradation in a furnace


Design of a specific grip system



## Residual mechanical properties of composites

A multi-physical characterisation approach

- Residual mechanical properties of degraded material
  - All tests performed, analysis performed,
  - Important decrease of the mechanical properties and no more rate effect!



## Coupling mechanical and fire loadings

General Methodology

- **Post impact fire loading**
  - Methodology for the analysis of combined mechanical and fire loading during the life cycle of the composite structure

Tyre debris impact on a composite panel      Post-impact damage analysis      Fire test

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## Tyre debris impact on a composite panel

Experimental setup

- **Impact loading with a gas gun**
  - Aircraft tyre from Michelin France

1st impact speed	Test 1: 150 m/s
	Test 2: 158 m/s
2 <sup>nd</sup> impact speed	Test 1: 171 m/s
	Test 2: 171 m/s
3rd impact speed	Test 1: 185 m/s
	Test 2: 186 m/s

Test Speeds


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## Tyre debris impact on a composite panel

Test video



- Impact loading of a T700/M21 panel with a gas gun



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## Post-impact damage analysis

NDT Protocol



- Experimental setup - Pulsed thermography: available at ONERA



Active infrared thermography

- Pulse duration: 4ms
- Energy: 6kJ

Methodology:

- Reflexion: Flash light and IR camera on the same side

Camera IR: FLIR X6540sc

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


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## Post-impact damage analysis

NDT Results



Impacted face

V=150 m/s	V=170 m/s	V=186 m/s
		
T700/M21		
Almost no damage	Some damage located in the surface ply	Damage and delamination across the thickness

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## Fire tests on impacted panels



- T700/M21 panels provided by CEiiA
- **Residual Fire resistant properties of impacted panels :**
  - Flame/composite interaction photographs on the exposed side
  - Thermal response on the back surface by quantitative IR thermography
  - Back surface deformation measured by Digital Image Correlation to detect delamination onset and growth
  - Mass loss measured during fire exposure
- All impact tests performed, analysis in progress (see previous slides),
- **Post-impact fire tests results before end of 2017,**



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# Conclusions

FSS P7 - Mitigate the risk of fire, smoke and fumes





- **Work Package 7.1:** Understanding and characterising the fire behaviour of primary structure composite materials,

Enhance knowledge concerning the fire behaviour and performance of CFRP primary structure materials

Produce a comprehensive experimental database on a reference composite material (T700GC/M21)

- A significant number of methodologies and results are now available for thermo-mechanical characterisation of composite material from the virgin state to the degraded one,
- T700/M21 data in WP71 deliverables,
- Model analysis in progress,



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## Consortium

Stichting Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium  
 Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt  
 Office national d'études et de recherches aérospatiales  
 Centro para a Excelência e Inovação na Indústria Automóvel  
 Centro Italiano Ricerche Aerospaziali  
 Centre Suisse d'Electronique et Microtechnique SA  
 Institutul National de Cercetari Aerospaziale "Elie Carafoli"  
 Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial  
 Výzkumný a zkušební letecký ústav, a.s.  
 Totalforsvarets Forskningsinstitut  
 European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation

Civil Aviation Authority UK  
 Airbus SAS  
 Airbus Operations SAS  
 Airbus Defence and Space  
 Thales Avionics SAS  
 Thales Air Systems SA  
 Deep Blue SRL  
 Technische Universität München  
 Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft  
 Service Technique de l'Aviation Civile  
 Embraer Portugal Estruturas em Compositos SA

Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute TsAGI  
 Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo Spa  
 Boeing Research and Technology Europe SLU  
 London School of Economics and Political Science  
 Alenia Aermacchi  
 Cranfield University  
 Trinity College Dublin  
 Zodiac Aerosafety Systems  
 Institut Polytechnique de Bordeaux  
 Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij  
 Sistemi Innovativi per il Controllo del Traffico Aereo

<http://www.futuresky-safety.eu>

Future Sky Safety has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under Grant Agreement No 640597. This presentation only reflects the author's view; the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

## Composite ply properties

Influence of the temperature increase on interface properties

**Influence of the high temperature on toughness properties**

- The thermal gradient stabilized the crack propagation
- The toughness decreases with the temperature

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## Composite ply properties

Influence of the temperature increase on interface properties

### Influence of the high temperature on toughness properties

Crack Heating due the joule heating

ε<sub>yy</sub> [%]

[-0.06 : 0.03] - Avg: -0.00

ε<sub>yy</sub> [%]

[-2.14 : 1.57] - Avg: 0.05

ε<sub>yy</sub> [%]

[-0.54 : 0.30] - Avg: -0.01

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**Appendix B.15** “P7: Cabin Air Quality – overview of issues and future directions” – Ricardo Reis, Embraer



The cover page features the European Commission logo on the top left and the Future Sky Safety logo on the top right. The title 'Cabin Air Quality- overview of issues and future directions' is centered in a large blue font. Below the title, a blue horizontal bar contains the text 'WP 7.3 Industrial Framework' and 'Ricardo Reis – Embraer Portugal'. The central image shows a commercial airplane from a low-angle perspective against a clear blue sky. At the bottom, the word 'index' is written in a light blue font, followed by a bulleted list of topics. The Future Sky Safety logo is also present in the bottom right corner of the page content area.

European Commission

**FUTURE SKY**  
SAFETY

# Cabin Air Quality- overview of issues and future directions

WP 7.3 Industrial Framework  
Ricardo Reis – Embraer Portugal

## index

- Cabin Air Quality
- Themes
- Current and future context
- Continuous sensing & monitoring
- New materials

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
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

## Working definition (FSS 7.3)



“  
Cabin air quality is the holistic  
(physical, chemical, biological,  
radiological) characteristics of cabin  
air.

CAQ





## Full system context

Revenue Passenger-Kilometres (billion)

2xPAX/ 15years

7.0 +6.3% trillion RPK growth rate in 2015

Air Pollution in World: time Air Quality Index Visual Map

Global Warming  
 Increased air quality awareness  
 Democratization of monitoring and reporting

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## FUTURE CABINS

Commercial Aircraft  
 Executive jets  
 ... On Demand Mobility?

Credit: newFACE: <http://newface.inegi.up.pt>  
 Almadesign, SETsa, INEGI, Embraer  
 COMPETE, QREN (FEDER)

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## Safety/Health : fumes and odours



### EASA Study (2017)

- Preliminary results:
  - CAQ better than other indoor environments (no events);
  - Pyrolised oils? No problems found;
  - Causal link between fumes events and health: not found & considered unlikely
- New large scale study: DG MOVE/EASA: €2 mill (2017)
- Focus on abnormal events.

### REACH

- NL requested TCP evaluation (2012)
- Information submission deadline (2018)
  - Neurotoxicity
  - Exposure
  - Information questionnaires, medical and clinical investigations
- Evaluation (2019)

## Safety/Health : fumes and odours




### SAE

- Cabin Air Quality Measurement Committee
- 2017, after IATA request Nov 2016
- “(..) standards for the measurement of air quality within the cockpit and passenger compartments. (..) developing a standard or standards covering portable and/or fixed installation sensors to quantitatively measure fumes and contaminants that could enter the cabin space.”

### CEN/TC 436

- Cabin Air Quality on civil aircraft – chemical agents
- develop European standards on "Cabin air quality on civil aircraft - Chemical agents" suitable for all stakeholders including passenger organizations, crew associations, aircraft and engine manufacturers, parts and components manufacturers, airlines and OSH (Occupational Safety and Health) representatives.


# Comfort: what synergies?



Source: "Aircraft Interior Comfort and Design", Peter Vink and Klaus Brauer 2011

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
# Comfort: what synergies?



Source: "Aircraft Interior Comfort and Design", Peter Vink and Klaus Brauer 2011

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## Comfort + Health: what synergies?



### Two row “thumb rule”...




Figure 1: Air circulation pattern in typical airline passenger cabin


Sources: “Transmission of infectious diseases during commercial air travel”, Alexandra Mangili, Mark A Gendreau, 2005  
 “On the 2-Row Rule for Infectious Disease Transmission on Aircraft”, V. S. Hertzberg and H. Weiss, 2016  
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## Benchmark : Automotive



- Change of perceptions: “new car smell”
- Defense against outside pollution: Tesla bio defense mode, Volvo CleanZone



As new Volvo prevents the most toxic emissions, harmful “fine dust” particles from entering the car while a sensor monitors the incoming air for hidden substances. If the outside air contains too much fine dust, a protective filter...

Sources: Volvo



Sources: Tesla

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## On board sensing

**Table 2. Cabin environmental quality issues relevant to stakeholders.**

Stakeholder	Sensor-Related Issues
<b>Regulatory agencies</b>	Compliance with FARS and ASHRAE Standard
<b>Aircraft manufacturers</b>	Safety, low cost, simplicity, maintenance alerts, aircraft ECS design improvements. ‘level playing field’
<b>Airlines<sup>a</sup></b>	Revenue, passenger comfort, minimal complaints, ‘level playing field’
<b>Crew</b>	Documenting exposures to contaminants (hydraulic fluids, pyrolysis products, pesticides); health risks; chemical sensitivity; compliance with standards; discomfort; access to data
<b>Passengers</b>	Health risks, comfort, access to data
<b>Researchers</b>	Exposure data related to health research and aircraft design improvements; access to data

Source: “The airliner cabin environment and the health of passengers and crew”, 2002

## Different approaches

Human Reporting



Industry Sensor Network



Community External Network?



## On Board continuous monitoring

**Requirements:**

1. Interface with aircraft (future/legacy)
2. Physical interfaces for sensors and operation
3. Functions through interface
4. Data repository – airline? Institutional?



Astrium E-Nose  
DLR project



The Third Generation JPL eNose Sensor Unit  
Volume ~80 cm<sup>3</sup>, Mass ~90 g  
A PDA, laptop computer or interface that can be used to process and analyze the data

JPL e-nose



Could this data be leveraged in a “big data” sense? E.g., can P4 show the way for governance and business model?

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## Continuous sensing

Human Reporting



Industry Sensor Network



Community External Network?




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## Scenario: Citizens “On Board” monitoring?

1. Passenger mobile device E-nose
2. Out of aviation ecosystem governance?



- i. Online Review Boards;
- ii. Pressure groups;
- iii. Operators use for managing passenger communities?
- iv. OEM?
- v. MRO?

1. How this scenario can improve safety?

## Benchmarking Citizens Labs



Rethorical question: How to incorporate with a “citizens lab” for indoor space air quality monitoring?

## Materials and substances: old and new

<p><b>APPLICATIONS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Structural</li> <li>• Isolation: thermal, acoustic</li> <li>• Furnishing</li> <li>• IFE</li> </ul>	<p><b>TYPES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Composites;</li> <li>• Nano materials;</li> <li>• Metamaterials;</li> <li>• Flexible electronics</li> </ul>
--	--

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## Materials and substances: old and new

**REACH COMPLIANCE**

Modelling  
Testing for aging and release (e.g, Cranfield, FSS 7.3)

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## Final words



- Different lead initiatives to clear doubts on on-board contaminants: research shows good CAQ so far but doubts linger;
- World trends point to increased pressure on the aviation system;
- New technology for filtering and sensing;
- Introduction of new materials seems robust but could be improved (efficiency wise?). Potential new challenges: nanotechnologies.



### Consortium

Stichting Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium  
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt  
Office national d'études et de recherches aérospatiales  
Centro para a Excelência e Inovação na Indústria Automóvel  
Centro Italiano Ricerche Aerospaziali  
Centre Suisse d'Electronique et Microtechnique SA  
Institutul National de Cercetari Aerospaziale "Elie Carafoli"  
Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial  
Výzkumný a zkušební letecký ústav, a.s.  
Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut  
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Civil Aviation Authority UK  
Airbus SAS  
Airbus Operations SAS  
Airbus Defence and Space  
Thales Avionics SAS  
Thales Air Systems SA  
Deep Blue SRL  
Technische Universität München  
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft  
Service Technique de l'Aviation Civile  
Embraer Portugal Estruturas em Compositos SA

Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute TsAGI  
Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo Spa  
Boeing Research and Technology Europe SLU  
London School of Economics and Political Science  
Alenia Aermacchi  
Cranfield University  
Trinity College Dublin  
Zodiac Aerosafety Systems  
Institut Polytechnique de Bordeaux  
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Sistemi Innovativi per il Controllo del Traffico Aereo

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*Future Sky Safety has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under Grant Agreement No 640597. This presentation only reflects the author's view; the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.*

## FSS Blackbox / E-nose

Source: Warwick university

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## FSS Blackbox / E-nose

**The Third Generation JPL E-Nose Sensor Unit**  
 90kPa ~100 conf. Mass ~100 g  
 A FOUL, highly sensitive and sensitive chip can be used to detect and measure 1000 different odors.

Source: Warwick university

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## IAQ Challenges & Solutions

1. **Respiratory system infections** - entrainment filtration at outlets.
2. **Low humidity** - cabin humidifiers & envelope pressurization.
3. **Bleed air and cabin air toxins**
  - Separate supply air bearing compressor.
  - Bleed air filter.
  - Entrainment filtration at cabin air outlets.
  - Envelope filtration.
  - Ionization oxidation.
4. **Fire safety** - Envelope exhaust, smoke sensors and fire suppressant injection.

Appendix C Posters

Appendix C.1 “P1: Coordination of Institutionally Funded Safety Research”



Project #1  
**COORDINATION OF INSTITUTIONALLY FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH**



## COORDINATION OF INSTITUTIONALLY FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH

The focus of P1 is to create a shared insight among the Research Establishments of the ongoing and planned safety research, in order to achieve coordination in the planning and conduct of new safety research projects and to create cooperative research projects in which multiple Research Establishments work together. This goal will be achieved by producing an annual Aviation Safety Research Plan for the participating institutions that will also be shared with the main European stakeholders. The coordination of institutionally funded safety research will be especially driven by this ASRP by identifying missing links and new institutionally funded safety research topics.

**Results:**

- Coordination Workshops (75 scientists & 6 representatives from the European Commission participated)
- Communication Platform for EREA partners (with currently more than 140 publications)
- Personnel Exchanges
- Annual Aviation Safety Research Plans
  - Annual assessment of safety research projects in EREA establishments
  - Review of European Safety Roadmaps
  - EREA Programme Manager Survey
- Evaluation of leverage effect
- Generic Collaboration Agreement
- Cooperation activities include:
  - Rotorcraft landing on ships (CIRA, DLR, NLR & ONERA )
  - Human Performance Envelope in the ATC context (CSEM & DLR)
  - RPAS safety roadmap



**2015 and ongoing**

- DLR-ONERA: HOTAS
- DLR-ONERA: ACAS
- DLR-NLR: multiple works

**2016**

- DLR-ONERA: Modelling of operator's behaviour
- DLR, NLR, ONERA, CIRA: Aircraft Wake Turbulence
- DLR-CSEM: Human Performance Envelope in the ATC Context

**2017**

- CEIA, CIRA, DLR, ELOT, NLR, ONERA & VZLU: Safety embedded in aircraft design and operations
- CEIA, CIRA, DLR, NLR & ONERA: Helicopter safety
- CIRA, CSEM, DLR, INCAE, INTA, ONERA & VZLU: Icing
- CIRA, DLR, INTA, NLR & ONERA: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) safety (incl. ATM)

**2018**

- CIRA, DLR, INCAE & ONERA: Volcanic ash
- CEIA, CIRA, DLR, INTA, NLR & ONERA: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) safety (incl. ATM)
- CEIA, CIRA, CSEM, DLR, INCAE, NLR, ONERA & VZLU: Health monitoring


**2019**

- Small autonomous electric AC
- Advanced flight envelope protection
- Human Performance envelope
- Mitigating the risk of fire, smoke and fumes
- Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) safety (incl. ATM)



Palenau 2<sup>nd</sup> Future Sky Safety Workshop; 01 – 02 February 2017

**Trend analysis for main categories for all projects in the D1.2 survey**



SKYbary main categories



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## Appendix C.2 “P3: Solutions for runway excursions”



Project #3  
 SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS  
 FOR RUNWAY EXCURSION  
 ACCIDENTS



### Defining the FEA Methodology Approach to Model Aircraft Tyre-Ground Interaction

The role of Cranfield University is to conduct the Analysis of Aircraft tyre Dynamics. For this, we are developing a finite element analysis (FEA) model that could predict the tyre-ground interaction under crosswind conditions and on (water) contaminated runways. In this work, it is presented the progress on the FEA model development for aircraft tyre – ground interaction.

#### Introduction

Develop a methodology to model and validate the interactions of an aircraft tyre and (water) contaminated runway and under veer-off conditions using finite element analysis (FEA)

#### Objectives

- Develop a realistic and representative aircraft tyre model (based on citation tyre 22x8.0-10 12PR) using FEA
- Implement dynamic rubber material properties in the FE model
- Validate the tyre-ground interaction FE models against experimental data

#### Material Modelling

##### 1 Rubber

- In aircraft tyres, strain rates has a huge impact on the behaviour of the rubber material
- An equation based model; Bergstrom-Boyce is used:



$$\sigma_A = \frac{\mu}{J_A} (\dot{\gamma})^{-1} \left( \frac{\dot{\gamma}}{\lambda_{lock}} \right) / \left( \dot{\gamma}^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{lock}} \right) \right) dev[b^*] + \kappa(J - 1)I$$


$$\sigma_B = \frac{\mu}{J_B \lambda_B^2} (\dot{\gamma})^{-1} \left( \frac{\dot{\gamma}}{\lambda_{lock}} \right) / \left( \dot{\gamma}^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{lock}} \right) \right) dev[b_B^*] + \kappa(J_B^* - 1)I$$

$$\sigma = \sigma_A + \sigma_B$$

- Tensile test at varying strain rates were carried out to develop, optimize and validate the material card

##### 2. Composite

- A composite material model is used to define the rubber/fibre combination
- Material data are obtained from tensile test



- Orthotropic material card selected to represent the rubber/fibre

##### FE Tyre over Wedge

- To get better understanding the static and dynamic behaviour of the tyre
- Tyre is rolled over a rigid wedge attached to a rigid ground



##### Rolling Tyre


- The tyre is rolled over a rigid surface
- Gravity and a load is applied
- Friction is represented by static and dynamic coefficients
- Experimental protocol in being conducted to validate the FEA model with test results



- Experimentation will be carried out in the near future to compare with predictions from FE model

#### Development of FE tyre model

- Development of methodology is done on the aircraft nose tyre (Michelin air 450x190-5)
- Convergence studies were carried out on cross section and revolution, to determine the most suitable mesh




#### Modification of FE tyre

- Pressure-Volume airbag were used to represent the inflation of the tyre
- Additional modification are required to ensure that no errors would occur when running the simulations
- Null shells were added to reduce negative volume effect



#### Quasi-Static Compression

- Aim is to replicate compressive behaviour of the tyre between experimentation and FE
- Solid element for plate and ground were used to allow better contact
- FE has an error of roughly 7% from experiment



#### Conclusion

The FEA methodology for tyre behaviour is proven to deliver useful and relevant information for the nose tyre Michelin air 450x190-5. The equation based material model helps to recreate stress-strain data at any strain rate. Initial validation shows data of error range between 5% - 10%

#### Future Work

- Apply same approach and validation technique (comparison to experimental data using test rig) to the citation tyre (22x8.0-10 12PR)
- Develop the frictional mode to introduce macroscopic behaviour
- Development of the Fluid-Structure Interaction model (FSI) between tyre and contaminated runway



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#### PROJECT CONSORTIUM

Coordinator Project #3: National Aerospace Laboratory NLR (NL)  
 Consortium Project #3: Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DE), Institutul National de Cercetari Aeronautice "Elie Carafol" (RO), Airbus SAS (FR), Airbus Operations SAS (FR), EADS Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (ES), Thales Avionics (FR), Thales Air Systems (FR), Deutsche Lufthansa Air-Beratergesellschaft (DE), DGAC – Service Technique de l'Aviation Civile (FR), Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (RU), Cranfield University (UK), Zodiac Aerospace Systems (FR), KLM (NL).



Project #3  
 SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS  
 FOR RUNWAY EXCURSION  
 ACCIDENTS



## TSAGI RESEARCH AIMED AT MITIGATING RISK OF RUNWAY EXCURSIONS

### Combination of factors

Detailed analysis of METAR archives of 5 Russian aerodromes for period from September 2015 to September 2016 is completed. It is shown that the combination of a strong crosswind (more than 10 m/s) and a slippery runway (braking efficiency worse than "Medium") is a rare situation (less than 1% of landings).

### Pilot questionnaire


A questionnaire on the RWY excursion problems was elaborated and used in inquiry of civil aviation linear pilots. It has allowed to assess the significance of the main risk factors and to confirm the relevance of the tasks to be resolved in the ongoing studies. The results indicate the need of additional simulations training for landing on a slippery runway conditioned by the crosswind and the necessity to improve simulation quality.

### Landing track reconstruction and description

There had been developed a technique for describing the trajectories of an airplane, which is based on the fragmentation of smooth trajectory into segments of given dimension. Track index was proposed to measure landing run quality.

### Data mining to identify abnormal flights

In cooperation with one of the airlines of the Russian Federation, a database and input data array were developed to test the selected methods of "data mining" in relation to identification of the precursors for aircraft accidents during landing. Gaussian Mixture Model is selected and tested now to identify abnormal flights.



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**PROJECT CONSORTIUM**  
 PS Consortium



Project #3  
 SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS  
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## WP 3.1 Crosswind and slippery runways

### Task 3.1.4 Models and analysis for dynamic interaction between aircraft/pilot and ground D 3.16 : Global simulation of a short time A/C trajectory on ground using multiphysics approach

Authors: Stefan BOGOS, Florentin Sperlea, Adrian TOADER, Gabriel COJOCARU, Alina CHIRA- National Institute for Aerospace Research (INCAS), ROMANIA

1. *The Research Objectives* is related to a proper dynamic A/C control model that simulate landing ground roll operation, in critical conditions of veer off on slippery runways and crosswind, fig. 1. These Objectives will imply:

- Evaluation of the A/C dynamics and trajectory in veer-off conditions.
- A study about the effect of Thrust Reverse engine jet Control (TRC) to mitigate the lateral deviation and to stabilize A/C on the runway.



As the nose landing gear touches the ground, the plane then veers off to the right  
 Fig. 1 Veer of in crosswind at Landing

2. A confident aerodynamic CFD simulation, at large sideslip angles, gives the aerodynamic coefficients and the pressure distribution, for a generic aircraft configuration, fig. 2.




Fig 2 Non linear aerodynamic coefficients at large sideslip angles, CFD simulation

3. *Fixed Thrust Reverser Effect* in crosswind on slippery runways is presented in fig. 3. When selecting reverse thrust with some crab angle, the reverse thrust results in two force components: a stopping force aligned with aircraft's direction of travel (runway centerline) and a side force, perpendicular to the runway centerline, which further increases the aircraft's tendency to skid sideways.



Fig. 3 Fixed Thrust Reverse Effect

4. *Mobile Thrust Reverse Vector Control*. The main idea of the Thrust Reverse Control (TRC) is to correct the skidding on the runway, in the slippery extreme condition of total slip, by creating a lateral force,  $Y_{TR}$  and  $Y_{TR}$ , using a controlled deflection of the thruster reverser fences angle,  $\delta_{TRC}$  and to control the permanent effect of rotation around the center of gravity, fig 4. This side force is opposite with crosswind direction and decreases the aircraft's tendency to skid sideways.



Fig 4 Mobile Thrust Reverse Vector Control

Fixed Thrust Reverse, fig. 3	Mobile Thrust Reverse control, fig. 4
$F_{TR} = F_{TRmax} \cdot \delta$	$F_{TR} = F_{TRmax} \cdot \delta \cdot \cos(\alpha)$
$F_{TR} > 0$	$F_{TR} < 0$
$F_{TR} < 0$	$F_{TR} < 0$
$\sum F_{TR} = F_{TR} + F_{TR} - F_{TRmax} \cdot \delta$	$\sum F_{TR} = F_{TR} - F_{TR} - F_{TRmax} \cdot \delta$
$\sum F_{TR} = F_{TR} + F_{TR} - F_{TRmax} \cdot \delta$	$\sum F_{TR} = F_{TR} - F_{TR} - F_{TRmax} \cdot \delta$
$\sum F_{TR} = F_{TR} + F_{TR} - F_{TRmax} \cdot \delta$	$\sum F_{TR} = F_{TR} - F_{TR} - F_{TRmax} \cdot \delta$

5. *The Mechanics equations, in matrix form*, for the specific forces and moments related to the A/C dynamics in ground roll, fig. 5, are written for the impulse theorem and the angular momentum theorem in the following forms:

➤ *the impulse theorem:*

$$\begin{bmatrix} M & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & M & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & M \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \dot{v}_x \\ \dot{v}_y \\ \dot{v}_z \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 & M\zeta & M\eta \\ -M\zeta & 0 & M\zeta \\ -M\eta & -M\zeta & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_x \\ v_y \\ v_z \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -\omega_x & \omega_y \\ \omega_x & 0 & -\omega_z \\ -\omega_y & \omega_z & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & M\zeta & M\eta \\ -M\zeta & 0 & M\zeta \\ -M\eta & -M\zeta & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \omega_x \\ \omega_y \\ \omega_z \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sum R_x \\ \sum R_y \\ \sum R_z \end{bmatrix}$$

➤ *the angular momentum theorem:*

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & -M\zeta & M\eta \\ M\zeta & 0 & -M\zeta \\ -M\eta & M\zeta & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \dot{\omega}_x \\ \dot{\omega}_y \\ \dot{\omega}_z \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} J_x & -J_{xy} & -J_{xz} \\ -J_{xy} & J_y & -J_{yz} \\ -J_{xz} & -J_{yz} & J_z \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \omega_x \\ \omega_y \\ \omega_z \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -\omega_x & \omega_y \\ \omega_x & 0 & -\omega_z \\ -\omega_y & \omega_z & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} J_x & -J_{xy} & -J_{xz} \\ -J_{xy} & J_y & -J_{yz} \\ -J_{xz} & -J_{yz} & J_z \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \omega_x \\ \omega_y \\ \omega_z \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sum N_x \\ \sum N_y \\ \sum N_z \end{bmatrix}$$

Fig. 5 Forces and Moments for A/C in Ground roll in crosswind



Project #3  
**SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS  
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**D 3.16 : Global simulation of a short time A/C trajectory on ground using multiphysics approach (cont.)**

6. **Maximum Crosswinds and reported runway braking coefficient for contaminated runways** that is recommended in Flight Crew Operation Manual (FCOM) for A319/ A320/A321, is presented in fig. 6. These values were considered as references in the numerical simulations.

7. **The results obtained after the numerical simulation take into account some hypotheses:**

- > auto braking system respect the standard of dynamic braking ; no rudder control;
- > maximum Thrust Reverse Control command,  $\delta_{TRC}$  is +/- 20 deg.;
- > Control law synthesis is based on goal to minimize the error, difference between the lateral displacement and the runway axis ( $\frac{dy_{error}}{dx} < 0$ );

8. **The calibration Results with No Crosswind, Crab angle=0 and No thrust reverse permit to find a correlation between the Effective Braking Coefficient, presented in fig.6, and the deceleration values, see table T1.**

Table T 1

Case	Runway choice	Braking choice deceleration	Effective Braking Coefficient (EBC)	EBC average result	Stopping distance (m)	Stop time (s)
1	0 (dry)	5 (3.8 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	>=0.4	0.48	632.61	17.84
2	1 (wet)	5 (3.8 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	<=0.4	0.305	731.1	22.01
3	1	4 (3.3 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	[0.36 - 0.39]	0.4	708.13	20.57
4	2 (slush)	3 (2.8 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	[0.3 - 0.35]	0.35	827.18	24.14
5	2	2 (2.4 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	[0.26 - 0.29]	0.29	961.21	28.09
6	3 (dry snow)	3 (2.8 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	[0.3 - 0.35]	0.32	854.26	23.55
7	3	2 (2.4 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	[0.26 - 0.29]	0.29	961.39	28.09
8	4 (water, hydro)	3 (2 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	<=0.25	0.1	2401.67	71.96
9	5 (icy)	3 (2 m/s <sup>2</sup> )	<=0.25	0.06	3760.93	115.33

9. **The final Results that summarized the Lateral deviation and the A/C final speed in veer-off conditions with crosswind on contaminated runways** are presented in Table T2. A summary of the most typical representatives results are presented in fig.7 for dry runway, fig.8 for wet runway, fig. 9 for slush runway, fig. 10 for dry snow and fig. 11 for water hydroplaning.

Table T2

Case	Runway choice	Braking choice	Crosswind (m/s)	CRAA residual angle (deg)	Thrust Reverse Control, NO to 0, YES to 1	Lateral deviation from the runway axis, at the final stop (m)
1st	0	5 (GOOD)	16.97	0	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=19.28 m/s 1.16
				0.46	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=22.77 m/s 11.88
2nd	1	5	16.97	0	1	Excuse out of the runway with V=20.84 m/s 14.26
				1.43	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=23.8 m/s 14.33
3rd	1	4 (MEDIUM-GOOD)	14.91	0	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=18.22 m/s 11.88
				1.37	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=21.09 m/s 6.98
4th	2	4 (MEDIUM)	12.86	0	1	Excuse out of the runway with V=17.06 m/s -9.76
				1.37	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=19.94 m/s -3.79
5th	2	3 (MEDIUM-POOR)	10.28	0	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=16.41 m/s -3.65
				1.37	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=18.41 m/s 6.28
6th	3	3	12.86	0	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=18.91 m/s -10.91
				1.37	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=21.7 m/s 1.27
7th	3	2	10.28	0	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=15.02 m/s -2.41
				1.37	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=17.32 m/s -3.32
8th	4	1 (POOR)	7.71	0	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=12.02 m/s -11.66
				1.37	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=14.72 m/s -20.8
9th	5	1	2.37	0	0	Excuse out of the runway with V=10.28 m/s 16.28

**10. Conclusions :**

- > **The analysis of the results of usage Thrust Reverse Vector Control show that this proposal is a consistent one to mitigate the veer-off effects in ground landing roll;**
- > **This idea could be a proposal for an INCAS patent for an automatic controller for A/C trajectory on contaminated runways in crosswind.**

Reported braking action	Reported runway friction coefficient	Maximum crosswind (kt)		Equivalent runway condition **
		takeoff	landing	
Good	≥ 0.6	28 *	33 *	1
Good/medium	0.39 to 0.26	24	26	1
Medium	0.25 to 0.13	20	25	2/3
Medium/poor	0.20 to 0.16	15	20	3/4
Poor	≤ 0.20	15	24	4/5
Unavailable		5	5	4/5

- \* This is the maximum crosswind demonstrated for dry and wet runway.
- \*\* Equivalent runway condition (only valid for maximum crosswind demonstration)
  1. Dry, damp or wet runway (less than 3 mm water depth)
  2. Runway covered with slush
  3. Runway covered with dry snow
  4. Runway covered with standing water with risk of hydroplaning or wet snow
  5. Ice runway or high risk of hydroplaning

Fig. 6 Crosswind limitation and braking coefficient on contaminated runways




Fig. 7. Case 1 lat A/C trajectory, Heading and Thrust Reverse Control angle in Crosswind, dry runway




Fig. 8. Case 3 lat A/C trajectory, Heading and Thrust Reverse Control angle in Crosswind, wet runway




Fig. 9. Case 4 lat A/C trajectory and Thrust Reverse Control angle in Crosswind, slush runway




Fig. 10. Case 6 lat A/C trajectory and Thrust Reverse Control angle in Crosswind, dry snow runway



Fig. 11. Case 8 lat A/C trajectory and Thrust Reverse Control angle in Crosswind, hydroplaning runway



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**PROJECT CONSORTIUM**

NLR, DLR, INCAS, AI-SAS, AI-F, ADSS, TAV, TR6, DUH, STAC, DARI, Crefield, ZAS, KLM

## Appendix C.3 “P4: Total system risk assessment”



Project #4  
TOTAL SYSTEM RISK  
ASSESSMENT




### Visualization of Model Inputs and Outputs in the Risk Observatory

**Usage of recorded data from flight operations (e.g. FDM data)**  
 FDM data can be obtained from QAR or FDR directly on the aircraft. Other operational data, e.g. weather or airport layout can be used.

**Incident Model, incorporating physics and system logics**  
 A model of the aircraft is created based mainly on physical relationships describing the motion of the aircraft (similar to flight simulations). Input distributions from FDM and weather data are propagated through this model.

**Model Output: Incident Probabilities**  
 An output distribution of the characteristic measure (such as distance to runway end) is obtained from the model. With this distribution, the probability of overrun can be estimated and the corresponding overrun speed.


**Visualization of Model Inputs and Outputs in the Risk Observatory**  
 The inputs and outputs of the model can be shown on an interactive dashboard. Input distributions of speed, weight, and wind are shown on top. Distance to runway end is shown superimposed on the airport map. A risk matrix shows the overrun risk as a combination of probability of overrun ground speed and severity level based on ground speed when passing runway end.




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**PROJECT CONSORTIUM**  
 Stichting Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium, Office national d'études et de recherches aérospatiales, Centro para a Excelência e Inovação na Indústria Automóvel, Centro Italiano Ricerche Aerospaziali, Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial, European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, Civil Aviation Authority UK, Airbus SAS, Airbus Operations SAS, Thales Avionics SAS, Thales Air Systems SA, Technische Universität München, Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Koninklijke Luchtmacht (Mitsubishi)

## Appendix C.4 “P7: Mitigating risks of fire, smoke and fumes”

Project #7  
**MITIGATING  
 THE RISK OF FIRE  
 SMOKE & FUMES**

### GEPOLYMER COMPOSITES: 2017 TEST RESULTS

**VZLÚ** Czech Aerospace Research Centre [www.vzlu.cz](http://www.vzlu.cz), [martaus@vzlu.cz](mailto:martaus@vzlu.cz)

#### Smoke Optical Density and Fire Effluents of Carbon fiber / Geopolymer Composite compared with referential Glass fiber / Phenol Composite (ISO 5659-2, EN 45545-2, DIN 5510-2)

#### Fire Penetration Tests of Carbon fiber / Geopolymer Sandwich Structures (CS-25, App. F, Part III)

#### Impact Tests of Carbon fiber / Geopolymer Sandwich Structures (incl. hot/wet exposed specimens) (ASTM D 7136/D 7136M – 07)

#### Drum Peel Tests of Carbon fiber / Geopolymer Sandwich Structures (ASTM D1781 – 98)

**Geopolymer resin GPL30 results as the best GP skins/core adhesive**

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**PROJECT CONSORTIUM**  
 P7 – DLR, VZLÚ, LEONARDO

## Appendix D Photos



